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ABSTRACT
Clarifying Resource Dependence: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Dependence and
Autonomy in Entrepreneurial Firms
Curtis R. Sproul
Entrepreneurial firms face dependence on other firms in the external environment to
access resources critical for the development and survival of the firm. While substantial research
has examined resource dependence and how firms may remedy such dependencies, the literature
often fails to acknowledge key factors that can predict and explain firm behavior and outcomes
in such situations. Firms are shown to enter into inter-organizational relationships in order to
remedy resource dependencies, but studies typically evaluate such relationships according to
their structure, rather than the resource being sought. Research also frequently ignores the role of
autonomy in resource dependence. As gaining autonomy is the primary goal of resource
dependence remedies, studies thus often assume autonomy is gained or may fail to consider the
social complexity of the environment. Resource dependence remedies are also shown to vary in
terms of their relationship to performance, creating additional questions within the literature.
This dissertation seeks to shed light on these issues by considering the type of resource sought
during a dependence remedy, the role of autonomy in dependence remedies, and how remedies
relate to firm performance.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer, 1972a; Pfeffer, 1972b; Pfeffer, 1972c;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) explains how organizations are influenced by their external
environment and what actions may be taken to manage the environment. The theory suggests
that organizations are embedded in social relationships and interdependent networks with other
organizations that may have differing goals. These social relationships and networks are
influenced by power, causing some organizations to be dependent on other organizations for
critical resources. Dependence on other organizations creates circumstances in which the
survival and success of the focal organization are uncertain (Pfeffer, 1987).
Considerable attention is devoted to the question of how firms alleviate their
dependencies on other firms, referred to in this dissertation as dependence remedies. Researchers
discuss many remedies, often focusing on inter-organizational relationships (IORs) such as joint
ventures (e.g., Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976), alliances (e.g., Xia, 2011), mergers and acquisitions
(e.g., Finkelstein, 1997), as well as the board of directors (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000).
Researchers also examine how remedies lead to outcomes such as firm performance (e.g., Lavie,
2007), the likelihood of a merger (e.g., Wang & Zajac, 2007), and alliance outcomes (e.g.,
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). These antecedents and outcomes may vary in detail, but each
represents a specific action by a firm in conjunction with another firm and that action’s outcome,
taken in an attempt to remedy dependence. This dissertation examines such antecedents and
outcomes by focusing specifically on inter-organizational relationships (IORs) such as joint
ventures, alliances, mergers and acquisitions, as well as the board of directors’ composition.
Firms frequently utilize these remedies, providing an opportunity to more carefully examine the
relationship between resource dependence remedies and their outcomes.
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Firms taking action to remedy dependence are seeking autonomy. Autonomy is a firm’s
freedom to make decisions regarding its internal resources without external influence (Oliver,
1991a). Pfeffer (2003) explains that autonomy is a critical concept for achieving desired
outcomes in RDT. Further, autonomy considers actors and concepts beyond customers and
products that were the primary focus of organizational research before RDT (Pfeffer, 2003).
Suppliers, government firms, and other actors in the environment that can affect the resources of
a firm may be considered when examining a firm’s autonomy (Pfeffer, 2003). As such,
autonomy is a critical component of RDT research.
RDT provides a strong theoretical lens for examining firms because it recognizes that
firms exist within a larger social environment comprised of other firms that may have differing
goals, and that those firms may exercise power and control over a focal firm by constraining its
resources (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). Additionally, firms are unable to meet all of the various
demands arising from the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). RDT’s recognition of power
as an important aspect of IORs helps explain what demands a firm chooses to meet and may
explain what otherwise appears to be irrational behavior (Pfeffer, 1987). At the same time, RDT
may consider more rationally sought outcomes such as firm performance (e.g., Kor & Leblebici,
2005). By looking beyond efficiency-based reasons for IORs, RDT provides a more holistic
approach to understanding strategic firm choices and their consequences (Pfeffer, 2003).
Problematic Issues in Resource Dependence Research
While resource dependence research has made considerable empirical and theoretical
advancements (Cascario & Piskorski, 2005), unexplored and unanswered questions remain. This
dissertation explores four specific problems that prevent researchers from completely explaining
and predicting firm actions and outcomes: (1) inadequate explanation of how different specific
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resource needs are remedied, (2) a lack of theoretical and empirical work regarding autonomy,
(3) failure to consider how different remedies for dependence relate to different types of
performance, and (4) failure to consider how firms may prevent new dependencies from
developing when firms take action to reduce dependence. Discussion of these problems
continues in greater detail in the following paragraphs.
First, RDT often explores remedies for dependence according to the structure of the
remedy, rather than the resource being sought. To better understand these remedies, more focus
should be given to the initial dependencies that firms face. While some research has examined
different types of dependence (e.g., Gabrielsson, 2007), a thorough understanding of the
differences between resource dependence remedies and their outcomes does not exist (Drees &
Heugens, 2013; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). By having a clearer understanding of the
specific dependencies that firms face, research in RDT can better explain how firms can remedy
such dependencies and capture additional benefits. For example, the success of joint ventures
(e.g., Das & Teng, 2003), acquisitions (e.g., Moatti, Ren, Anand, & Dussauge, 2015), or the
appointment of a specific type of director to the board (e.g., Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, &
Cannella, 2008) typically dominate the literature. While these avenues of study are important to
the understanding of firms, they often ignore the type of resource sought by the firm. For
example, firms seeking manufacturing resources are likely to enter into IORs with corporations,
while firms seeking marketing resources are not (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008).
Research ignoring the type of dependence may thus be overlooking an important explanatory
characteristic.
Second, studies using a resource dependence lens often overlook autonomy as a distinct
construct of material importance. Originally conceived as an industry-level construct (Burt 1979;
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1980), autonomy has also been used at the firm-level to measure the ability to deal with payment
problems and independence from government (Peng & Luo, 2000), subunit power (Galang &
Ferris, 1997), cash on hand (Uzzi, 1999), and management (as opposed to ownership) controlled
firms (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1986). Broadly speaking, autonomy has been shown to mediate the
relationship between IORs and performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013). However, scholars lack a
sufficient conceptual understanding of autonomy. The limited development of the autonomy
construct has led to a multitude of operationalizations, which further complicates the
understanding of resource dependence and the outcomes firms seek through dependence
remedies. Furthermore, research suggests that autonomy is multifaceted. For example, Drees and
Heugens (2013) find that autonomy differs when IORs are ownership-based and non-ownershipbased. Given that autonomy mediates the relationship between actions that remedy dependence
and performance, a clearer understanding of the construct, as well as what types of autonomy
may exist may provide evidence that further explains the remedies that firm pursue in their
attempts to reduce dependence, and how those attempts relate to firm performance.
Third, RDT is not a consistent predictor of firm performance (Drees & Huegens, 2013).
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue and Pfeffer (2003) conspicuously states that remedies for
dependence are sometimes successful. Additionally, RDT does not assume that firm actions are
taken with conscious, economically beneficial factors in mind, nor does it exclude such actions
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1987). Burt (1983) addresses one aspect of mixed
performance results and uncertain drivers of dependence remedies, suggesting that cooptive
IORs are maintained as long as they are beneficial to both firms, therefore producing little
variance in outcomes. Burt’s (1983) reasoning, though, focuses only on the exercise of power.
Indeed, RDT produces both positive (e.g., Lavie, 2007) and negative (e.g., Koka & Prescott,
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2008; Hayward, 2003) relationships with firm performance. Additionally, no specific link
between remedy and performance type has been investigated. Understanding differences in
performance outcomes and what performance types are likely to arise from specific remedies can
significantly advance the resource dependence literature.
Finally, Pfeffer (1987) suggests that remedies for resource dependence are likely to
produce new sets of dependencies, leaving firms in new but still dependent situations. For
example, firms may appoint a new board member from a financial institution in an attempt to
remedy a need for capital, only to become dependent on the financial institution for survival and
thus influenced by the new board member (Mizruchi, 1996). In contrast, IORs involving a degree
of cooperation or that provide complementary resources in addition to the exchanged resources
may create a set of conditions that lead to mutual benefit for both firms (Oliver, 1990). Oliver
(1990) suggested that IORs could exist due to reciprocity, efficiency, or stability. IORs that do
exist for these reasons, rather than coercion, may bring benefits to the firm instead of new
dependencies that require remedies.
Dissertation Goals and Specific Research Questions
This dissertation addresses the above problems by examining the IORs of entrepreneurial
firms. Firms engage in IORs to gain access to resources that they currently lack (e.g., Meyer,
Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). Entrepreneurial firms are especially likely to be dependent
upon others for critical resources needed for survival and growth as they are often unable to
create or acquire such resources organically (Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002). For
example, access to outside capital leads to growth, as firms gain the flexibility to hire additional
employees or increase R&D spending (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Columbo & Grilli, 2010).
Additionally, entrepreneurial firms rarely possess all the resources required for operations (Katila
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et al., 2008). For example, manufacturing facilities are very costly and typically take multiple
years to build (Park, Chen, & Gallagher, 2002). Such facilities are critical resources for
entrepreneurial firms, as manufacturing resources allow for greater control over the
manufacturing process (Park et al., 2002) and lead to higher firm performance (Zahra & George,
1999). Entrepreneurial firms may also lack marketing resources, which provide the ability to
enter new markets (Koka & Prescott, 2008), or access to additional brands and products
(Kalaignanam, Shankar, & Varadarajan 2007). Resources such as these are shown to not be
interchangeable (Ozmel, Robinson, & Stuart, 2013), suggesting that entrepreneurial firms may
seek any or all of them depending on their specific dependencies.
In order to contribute to theory that explains and predicts the relationship between
dependence remedies, autonomy, and firm performance, this dissertation examines how types of
resource dependence are remedied and the outcomes of such remedies. Overall, this dissertation
seeks to better explain and predict the relationship between resource dependence remedies and
firm performance by investigating IORs that grant access to different types of resources, how
those varied resources provide autonomy to the firm, and how that autonomy affects firm
performance. Additionally, the ability of complementary resources to provide benefits in IORs,
as opposed to creating new dependences (Pfeffer, 1987) is evaluated. In doing so, contributions
and clarification are provided to resource dependence theory.
Considering the different types of resources, remedies, and characteristics of autonomy
previously discussed, research questions relating to how entrepreneurial firms remedy
dependencies will now be developed. Each research question follows the previous arguments
regarding problems present in resource dependence theory. The first question focuses on types of
resource dependence. Firms facing dependencies utilize several different strategies to remedy
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dependence and (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, firms utilize joint ventures (Pfeffer &
Nowak, 1976), mergers and acquisitions, (Pfeffer, 1972b), alliances (Barringer & Harrison,
2000), and the board of directors (Pfeffer, 1972c) in attempts to reduce dependence. However,
research has primarily focused on the strategies themselves, rather than the resources being
sought. While some scholars examine dependencies based on alliance types (Das, Sen, &
Sengupta, 1998) and resources types (Katila et al., 2008), little theoretical development of
specific types of dependence has occurred. The need for such examination is apparent, as
outcomes have been shown to differ depending on the type of resource sought (Katila et al.,
2008) and the manner in which the resource is acquired (Das et al., 1998). Therefore, the first
research question asks:

1: How are different resource dependencies remedied?

The next research question seeks to further explain the varying relationship between
resource dependence remedies and firm performance (Drees & Huegens, 2013). Entrepreneurial
firms require resources for growth and survival (Daily et al., 2002) and thus are likely to seek
remedies that lead to performance. However, RDT suggests that firm attempts to remedy
dependencies are not guided by rational decision processes, and so may or may not result in the
intended consequence (i.e., higher performance) (Pfeffer, 1987). Indeed, research finds both
positive (e.g., Luo & Park, 2004) and negative (e.g., Koka & Prescott, 2008) relationships
between remedies and firm performance. This begs the question of how different types of
dependence remedies are related to performance. Thus, the second research question asks:
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2: How are different resource dependence remedies related to performance?

Autonomy is considered a key construct in RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and
IORs in general (Oliver, 1991a). However, research has failed to develop autonomy in a
meaningful way. Oliver (1991a) proposed that autonomy has a positive relationship with firm
performance, stemming from three distinct sources. Autonomy allows a firm to (1) meet the
demands of multiple external actors simultaneously, (2) respond to unforeseen contingencies,
and/or (3) avoid opportunistic behavior on the part of other parties. Scholars have investigated
autonomy in a wide variety of contexts, such as network effects (Uzzi, 1999), avoiding
dependence on powerful actors (Peng & Luo, 2000), and internal control of the firm (Stearns &
Mizruchi, 1986). These varying uses of autonomy suggest a lack of consensus regarding an
important theoretical construct. As previously discussed, resource dependence is proposed to
possess different characteristics depending on the type of resource being sought. It is unlikely
that such differences will lead to autonomy in similar manners. Given the various treatments of
autonomy in the literature, autonomy also appears likely to possess different characteristics
depending on the resource sought by the firm. These largely unexplored differences in autonomy
lead to the third research question.

3. How does autonomy affect the relationship between dependence remedies and
performance?

Assumptions in RDT suggest that firms undertaking dependence remedies will also
create new dependencies, effectively trading one set of dependencies for another (Pfeffer, 1987).
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However, firms may instead be able to create joint dependence, causing firms to work together
for mutual benefit rather than attempting to impose their will on each other (Gulati & Sytch,
2007). Given that such IORs may be characterized by joint dependence insofar as both parties
are mutually dependent on each other, it begs the fourth research question, which asks:

4: How can dependence remedies prevent new, negative dependencies, from forming?

Organization of Dissertation

This dissertation consists of seven (7) chapters. This introduction serves as the first
chapter. Chapter I has presented and overview of the problematic issues facing research in
resource dependence and firm performance, explained the goals of the dissertation and
specifically stated research questions relating to resource dependence remedies, autonomy, and
firm performance. Chapter II reviews relevant literature in the areas of RDT in general, including
power, dependence types, IORs, autonomy, and performance. Chapter II seeks to present the
seminal work in RDT, evaluate the current state of the literature, and identify areas in need of
further research.
Chapter III builds on the literature review in Chapter II, integrates theory on the role of
complementary resources in IORs, and develops specific hypotheses that test the relationship
between dependence remedies, autonomy, firm performance, and complementary resources.
Nine hypotheses are developed based on the research questions expressed in Chapter I.
Chapter IV discusses the methodology of the dissertation. It presents the research design,
data sources, variables, operationalizations, and empirical analysis used for testing. Next,
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Chapter V presents the results of the hypotheses given in Chapter III based on the methods
detailed in Chapter IV.
Chapter VI discusses the results of the analysis, their implications for management
scholars, and the contributions of the dissertation. Limitations are also discussed. Finally,
Chapter VII contains the overall conclusion.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

While research in resource dependence has been prolific and expanded well beyond the
original theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), many core ideas related to resource dependence
theory are often overlooked in the literature. This development has caused one of the original
authors of the theory to remark that it has been reduced to a “…metaphorical statement about
organizations” (Pfeffer, 2003, p. xvi). Wry et al. (2013) examine this claim and review the
overall impact and contributions of the original theory, as well the phenomenon investigated.
Overall, results show that many scholars fail to consider issues related to the external
environment and interactions between firms (Wry et al., 2013). Several unanswered questions
remain regarding how firms remedy dependence.
First, the autonomy of a firm is an important consideration (Oliver, 1991b). Firms facing
power disadvantages lack autonomy, which constrains the actions they may take and causes
dependence (Pfeffer, 1987). The extent of a firm’s dependence is related to the importance of the
resource to the focal firm, the extent to which the resource provider has authority over resource
distribution, and the availability of alternative substitute resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Autonomy is shown to be a critical component in the relationship between resource dependence
remedies and firm performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013), but is often overlooked in the
literature (Wry et al., 2013).
Second, research examining remedies for dependence often focus on the structure of the
inter-organizational relationship (IOR) used as a remedy, while ignoring the type of resource
sought. For example, studies examine joint ventures (e.g., McCann, 1991) or the board of
directors (e.g., Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). A focus on the structure of the IOR is relevant,
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but there are important issues related to the type of resource sought. Katila, Rosenberg, and
Eisenhardt (2008) find that the scarcity of a resource and level of commitment required to obtain
it produces different decisions by firms regarding how to access such resources. Examination of
the commitment and type of resource sought may help shed additional light on the relationship
between resource dependence remedies and performance.
Finally, entrepreneurial firms may be especially vulnerable to resource dependency
(Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002). As entrepreneurial firms tend to be younger and
smaller, they likely lack the resources needed to grow and succeed (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman,
2003). Firms seek resources from other firms in the external environment (e.g., Baum &
Silverman, 2004) to overcome such a liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1996). However,
a lack of resources creates situations in which entrepreneurial firms may lack bargaining power,
making it difficult to overcome resource dependencies. Indeed, firms seeking remedies may
simply trade one dependency for another (Pfeffer, 1987), face power disadvantages that reduce
firm performance (e.g., Gulati & Sytch, 2007), or control by IOR partners (e.g., Mizruchi, 1996).
This chapter progresses as follows. First, this chapter presents an overview of theories
that are frequently used in the literature to predict and explain firm behavior and outcomes
related to environmental dependence and remedies. Second, the literature on environmental
dependence and the remedies for such dependence will be reviewed. The purpose of this review
is to evaluate the existing research and identify potential research deficiencies that deserve future
study.
Theoretical Explanations
Resource Dependence Theory
Resource dependence theory was developed to explain how organizations influence other
organizations in the external environment, and what may be done to manage the environment
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(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer (1987) explicitly presented the underlying assumptions for
resource dependence. First, organizations are the fundamental units of analysis in the study of
intercorporate relations and society. Second, organizations are constrained by environments
comprised of interdependent organizations, causing a lack of autonomy. Third, organizational
survival and success are uncertain due to the unforeseeable actions of interdependent
organizations. Fourth, organizations will seek to reduce or remedy interdependencies. However,
these actions are likely to create new interdependent situations, suggesting that some level of
interdependence will always be present. Lastly, dependence and interdependence dictate both
inter-organizational and intra-organizational power. This power then affects the actions of the
organization. The integration of theory about interdependent organizations and power allows for
predictions about organizational responses (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013).
Based on these assumptions, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) explain the task of organization
management as the management of a coalition that ensures the survival of the organization. The
coalition is made up of actors both inside and outside the focal organization. Interdependence
between the coalition and focal organization can be beneficial when actors work together for
mutual benefit but is difficult when there are conflicting and competing demands from coalition
members (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These demands can cause dependence, which is a factor of
three things: the importance of the resource to the focal firm, the extent to which the resource
provider has authority over resource distribution, and the availability of alternative substitute
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These ideas build upon earlier work in power (Emerson,
1962) and organizational environments (Thompson, 1967) that describe interactions between
actors.
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Emerson’s (1962) theory of power relations incorporated power, authority, legitimacy,
and power structures into one theory. Emerson defines power as the amount of resistance by
actor B that actor A can overcome. The relational aspect of each actors’ power over the other
makes the insight novel for its time. Emerson notes that the power of A over B does not
necessarily cancel out the power of B over A, as this power may not be balanced. For example, a
business owner and key employee may have power over the other. However, the relationship
may be unbalanced if the employee has made threats to leave the business without notice and the
owner has no viable alternative to replace the employee.
Thompson (1967) continued research in power by raising the level of analysis to the
organization. Organizations aim to shield or insulate a technical "core" from uncertainty in the
environment. By instituting systems that control resources, organizations can effectively create
contingencies for uncertainty and optimally exploit their technological advantage. Thompson
(1967) explains the process of managing external contingencies as ‘bridging” and suggests that
alliances, joint ventures, mergers, and cooptation are some of the available tools for managing
such contingencies. Indeed, many of these tools are used by Pfeffer and colleagues to explain
remedies for resource dependence (Pfeffer 1972b; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978).
Pfeffer also contributed early empirical results and theoretical development to power
issues stemming from three separate types of interdependence (1972b; 1972c). First, symbiotic
interdependence exists between firms in a buyer and supplier relationship. In this case,
interdependence causes uncertainty related to necessary inputs and maintaining important
customers. Second, competitive interdependence exists between two firms engaged in similar
businesses and competing for the same customers. Uncertainty then stems from the competition
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present in their environment, as firms are unsure about the actions of their rivals. Lastly, firms
may diversify to move away from previous interdependencies.
The primary focus of the RDT literature is investigating action taken by organizations to
remedy dependence. One remedy involves utilizing the board of directors to bring various
benefits to the firm. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) propose that directors bring four benefits to an
organization that can help remedy dependence. First, directors bring valuable information in the
form of advice and counsel related to firm activities (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Second,
directors provided access to information external to the organization through their personal
relationships (e.g., Hillman, 2005). Third, the same relationships could bring preferential access
to resources (e.g., Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994). Finally, directors could add legitimacy to an
organization (e.g., Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001).
Firms may also remedy dependencies by utilizing alliances and joint ventures to gain
access to resources (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004). Alliances help firms avoid uncertainty present in the
external environment, seek out cooperation (Steensma, Marino, Weaver, & Dickson, 2000), and
reduce interdependence (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). In general, firms prefer the lower
commitment level of a joint venture or alliance, compared to the higher commitment required for
a merger or acquisition (Folta, 1998). However, higher commitments are sometimes required to
access scarce resources. Mergers and acquisitions also allow firms to access needed resources
but require a higher commitment than the more temporary nature of alliances or joint ventures.
Pfeffer (1972b) began work in mergers through the lens of resource dependence, finding that
interdependence between firms is likely to lead to a merger, which then reduces interdependence
(Pfeffer, 1972b). Mergers are used to reduce symbiotic interdependence resulting from buyer-
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supplier relationships, competitive interdependence resulting from the actions of rival firms, and
for diversification purposes (Pfeffer, 1972b; Finkelstein, 1997).
Resource-Based Theory
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm states that firms gain a competitive
advantage when the resources they control are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable
(Barney, 1991). The RBV proposes that resources are developed internally (Barney, 1991), but
resources can also be accessed externally through various types of alliances (Das & Teng, 2000).
Entrepreneurial firms, which typically lack the internal resources required for firm growth and
survival, are especially likely to seek necessary resources externally (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001).
Firms whose resources are immobile and non-substitutable are more likely to seek out other
necessary resources through alliances (Das & Teng, 2000). Das and Teng (2000) further propose
that firms seeking resources from alliances benefit when resources match in a particular way.
Alliances between firms with similar resources, or with dissimilar resources that are
complementary to each other are proposed to increase performance (Das & Teng, 2000).
While early research in the RBV (Barney, 1991) focused on strategic management and
used entrepreneurship mostly as a context, additional research demonstrates that the RBV can
provide a clear lens to predict and explain how entrepreneurs and their firms create
heterogeneous resource bundles (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). Alvarez and Busenitz (2001)
explain that the RBV applies to entrepreneurship by defining the opportunity-seeking behavior
and resource organization capabilities of firms as resources. Applying the RBV to
entrepreneurial firms seeking external remedies for dependence can explain how resources are
involved in the formation of such remedies. Firms possessing complementary resources are more
likely to create economic value (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). However, the RBV may overlook the
relational aspect of the remedies (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). For example, the size difference
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between large, established firms and entrepreneurial firms can result in unenforceable contracts
and the exploitation of the entrepreneurial firm by the larger firm (Lu & Beamish, 2006). Firms
whose resources are rare, valuable, inimitable, and non-substitutable are less to face highly
dependent situations, as they already possess critical resources needed for survival. However,
firms seeking such resources may face dependence, as options for accessing such resources are
likely to be limited, and firms controlling them are likely to have strong bargaining power.
Alvarez and Barney (2001) succinctly describe the benefit of resource acquisition and the
potential drawbacks associated. One interviewed firm, near bankruptcy, entered into an
agreement worth $5 million dollars in revenue from a large partner, saving the firm. Conversely,
another firm described how their larger partner gained access to their technology and
commercialized it without them, leaving their employees out of work and the firm bankrupt
(Alvarez & Barney, 2001). While these issues are ignored in some RBV studies, another stream
of the literature focuses on the relational aspects of resources.
Dyer and Singh (1998) explain how firms may gain a competitive advantage by working
together in IORs to generate relational rent. Relational rent represents returns from the use of a
production factor that is greater than the next-best use of that factor (Peteraf, 1994). Trading
partners are more likely to generate relational rents when they possess relation-specific assets,
utilize knowledge-sharing routines, identify and access complementary resources between firms,
and engage in effective governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Lavie (2006) expands on this
relational view by considering firms in alliance networks. In addition to the relational rent
described by Dyer and Singh (1998), firms may benefit from inbound spillover rent gained
through opportunistic behavior toward an alliance partner. More specifically, firms may seek to
understand the advantages possessed by an alliance partner and use that knowledge for their
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gain. Firms may also lose outbound spillover rent when alliance partners behave in such ways
towards the focal firm (Lavie, 2006). The concept of relational rents runs counter to some
assumptions and recommendations of resource dependence theory, as they infer that all firms
may not have conflicting goals and that the primary goal of firms may not be to increase the
dependence of other firms. In such cases, firms may successfully remedy dependence by
correctly identifying IOR partners that will also seek relational rents and work for the benefit of
both firms. However, spillover rents suggest that opportunism remains, that dependence may still
occur and that both positive and negative outcomes of IORs are possible.
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory is largely concerned with legitimacy, whereby firms adopt the formal
structures and norms of other firms in the environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such structures
and norms are typically accepted as necessary without consideration regarding their effect on the
operations of a firm. As these structures and norms are backed by public opinion, a lack of
legitimacy that can be a threat to the survival of the firm (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and young
firms may lack legitimacy due to a liability of newness (Stichcombe, 1965). Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) suggest that a lack of legitimacy is one form of dependence and that firms seeking to
remedy a lack of legitimacy may do so by entering into IORs with other firms.
Firms can gain legitimacy by entering into an IOR with other firms that are already
considered legitimate (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). However, such legitimizing processes can
be a drain on financial resources, as a larger partner granting legitimacy may lower the
profitability of an IOR. These costs then only make overall operations more difficult (Lu &
Beamish, 2006).
Second, the environment in which a firm operates can play a role in the legitimacy of the
firm. For example, firms expanding internationally may suffer from a liability of foreignness
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stemming from a lack of knowledge about the firm from individuals and groups in the local
environment, causing a lack of legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). A liability of foreignness
is made up of all costs associated with doing business in a foreign country (Zaheer, 1995),
suggesting that there are both direct expenses and indirect costs involved. One remedy for this
lack of legitimacy is to partner with a domestic firm in the host country (Lu & Beamish, 2006),
thereby gaining legitimacy by associating with an already legitimate firm (Barringer & Harrison,
2000). Firms also may or may not be granted legitimacy from the institutional environment in
which they operate. For example, foreign firms may be considered legitimate by potential
investors when their home country has strong legal protections in place (Bell, Moore, &
Filatotchev, 2012). Such legitimacy may improve the success of a remedy for dependence on
financial resources.
Research suggests that legitimacy may improve or hinder firm performance. Legitimacy
gained through IORs may reduce real costs (Zaheer, 1995), suggesting that it may improve
performance. Conversely, such IORs may also be costly (Lu & Beamish, 2006), suggesting that
performance may suffer. Overall, legitimacy is not found to be a factor in the relationship
between resource dependence remedies and performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013). Legitimacy
may perhaps be related to the effectiveness of remedies, rather than a remedy itself (e.g., Bell et
al., 2012).
Agency Theory
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) broadly describes the relationship between
principals, who own firms, and agents, who manage them. The relationship is further described
as being contractual in nature, and agency theory thus defines the firm as a nexus of contracts
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory attempts to remedy two issues relating to the
principal-agent relationship. First, the goals of principals and agents may not always coincide,
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and the principal typically has imperfect information available to monitor the agent. Second, risk
plays a key role, as principals and agents may have different levels of risk tolerance. Agency
theory specifies that these problems can be remedied through the efficient use of contracts
between principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While agency theory may often
describe remedies for the aforementioned principal-agent problem, it also describes relationships
between the board of directors and the firm when the board is utilized to remedy dependence on
financial resources.
Agency theory describes aspects of financial remedies brought upon by IORs between
firms and financial institutions. Firms are shown to appoint members of financial institutions to
the board of directors to gain access to financing (Mizruchi & Steans, 1994). This is especially
true for firms seeking financing from venture capital firms, as firms exchange equity and board
of director positions for financing that can be used to grow and develop the firm (Park &
Steensma, 2014). In either instance, these board members may provide monitoring or additional
resource provision through their advice and counsel (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
Like institutional theory, agency theory’s role in resource dependence often reflects
aspects of a remedy that effect the success of the remedy. For example, some studies find that
boards engaging in monitoring the firm may have no effect or even lower firm performance
(Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007; Wijbenga, Postma, & Stratling, 2007). However, another proposes
that monitoring has an inverted-U shaped relationship with performance (Garg, 2013). Each of
these studies examines the role of directors who are appointed as part of a remedy for financial
dependence.
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Signaling Theory
Signaling theory describes how information about ambiguous or difficult to observe
characteristics can be communicated through visible external signals (Spence, 1973). Signals are
sent from parties with more information to other parties with less information when those parties
are involved in a transaction of some kind (Spence, 2002). When a signal is successfully sent
and received it can work to minimize information asymmetry between people or groups, and
ideally identifies the signaling party as higher in quality or superior to parties that do not signal
(Spence, 2002). For example, in Spence’s (1973) original study, job seekers signaled their
quality by obtaining a college education and reporting it to firms as they sought employment.
Signals themselves do not necessarily remedy dependence but convey information to other
parties that influence the effectiveness of a dependence remedy.
Signals are often sent by firms to potential investors in an attempt to improve the
outcome of financial remedies. For example, signals are used by firms and prospective investors
to determine the value of the firm (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). The presence of outside
members on the board of directors or board leadership that is separate from firm leadership
signals firm quality to potential investors, which may increase the effectiveness of financial
dependence remedies (Certo et al., 2001). Additionally, independent boards of directors are
shown to help attract key stakeholders by signaling that board monitoring is taking place
(Deutsch & Ross, 2003). Signals can also be in the form of IORs, such as how Park and Mezias
(2005) describe alliance announcements as signals about actual firm action, as opposed to
rumors, to investors. However, signals may not always be effective. As signals are not a standard
or clear form of communication, issues may arise with their use. Park and Mezias (2005) also
show that signals can vary regarding their strength and their meaning, possibly creating
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additional confusion or information asymmetry rather than clarifying uncertainty regarding firm
survival.
Firms may also use relationships with prestigious organizations to signal a strong
reputation and access to resources (Honig, Lerner, & Raban, 2006). Signaling in such a way can
increase a firm’s ability to secure outside investors and to increase performance (Honig et al.,
2006). In this manner, signaling theory is similar to institutional theory, in that signals are
attempting to relay legitimacy (Certo, 2003). In a similar manner to affiliations with legitimate
firms (Honig et al., 2006), a prestigious board of directors may signal the quality of the firm
(Certo et al., 2001). Indeed, a prestigious board described by signaling theory and affiliations
with legitimate firms described by institutional theory may be used to describe the same
phenomenon: the appointment of prestigious outside board members to the board of a firm
seeking legitimacy.
Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction Cost Economics’ (TCE) focuses on transactions between organizations, and
how the costs associated with such transactions varies across different types of organizational
forms (Williamson, 1975). Williamson explains that cost minimization drives the manner in
which firms handle transactions (1991). As such, firms may choose transactions through market,
hybrid, or hierarchal governance forms. Market transactions are arms-length transactions. Firms
engaging in market transactions are not dependent on one another, as the transaction is likely
easily made and multiple alternatives are likely available. Hybrid forms of transaction
governance involve commitments between firms, as contracts are used to bind the behavior of
firms. These agreements also describe what ranges of divergence from the specific agreement
can be remedied, what information must be disclosed, and typically utilizes arbitration to settle
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disagreements rather than the court system. Hierarchy governance refers to the internalization of
the transaction. Rather than engaging with another firm to secure a resource, firms decide to
produce the resource themselves, sometimes through the acquisition of another firm.
Acquisitions eliminate the need for contract law or the use of courts, as internal firm rules and
procedures can be used to dictate the terms of production (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991).
Firms choose a form of transaction governance based on three characteristics relating to
the transaction (Williamson, 1991). First, the asset specificity of the transaction describes the
flexibility of assets used in the transaction. Specifically, assets that are only usable for one
specific transaction are considered highly specific, while assets that may be used for numerous
transactions are considered to have low asset specificity. Second, uncertainty plays a role in the
choice of governance form but does so according to the level of asset specificity required.
Williamson (1985) explains that low asset specificity likely leads to market governance
regardless of the uncertainty since firms can easily find new transaction partners if necessary.
However, when a significant level of asset specificity is coupled with uncertainty, firms are
likely to choose hybrid or hierarchy governance in order to reduce the risk involved with market
transactions that can vary substantially from traction to transaction (Williamson, 1985). The very
highest levels of uncertainty, however, are likely to produce either market or hierarchal
governance. In this case, market-based governance allows for greater flexibility, and hierarchy
allows for decisions to be made without other firms. Market and hierarchy are thus better suited
for situation characterized by high uncertainty, as hybrid forms are not likely to provide either
the flexibility to adapt or certainty that firms seek (Williamson, 1991). Lastly, the frequency of
the transaction can also determine governance forms much like uncertainty. Transactions that
frequently occur, coupled with asset specificity, push firms to hierarchy governance, as
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monitoring costs may otherwise by too high. Infrequent transactions are likely to lead to market
governance, as forming hierarchal governance is likely to be very costly (Williamson, 1985).
Overall, the theories outlined above seek to explain the actions of firms seeking remedies
for dependence on various resources. Some approaches, such as resource dependence theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), relational aspects of RBV (Lavie, 2006), and TCE approaches that
consider opportunism (e.g., Joshi & Stump, 1999) offer mechanisms with which to explain the
social aspect of IORs that seek to remedy dependence. Other theories typically focus more on the
overall value and importance of the resource acquired, such as the traditional RBV (Barney,
1991). Institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) tends to recognize the social aspect of IORs
when considering legitimacy, but often ignores the quality of the IOR or any tangible resource
acquired. Signaling theory offers explanations regarding why some remedies may be more
successful than others, but may not consider if the remedy being sought is the best strategy for
the firm. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) sheds light on how IORs built through the
board of directors can incentivize actions that benefit the firm, but makes various assumptions
regarding the behavior of directors that are challenged by other scholars (e.g., Core, Holthausen,
& Larcker, 1999). To best understand the potential contributions of each of these theories and the
overall literature addressing remedies for resource dependence, autonomy, and performance, a
systematic review of the literature is conducted.
Review of Dependence Remedies, Autonomy, and Performance
Extensive research, utilizing numerous theories as described above, examines resource
dependence, remedies for dependence, autonomy, and performance outcomes since Pfeffer and
colleagues brought mainstream attention to the subject in the 1970s. However, uncertainty still
exists regarding the relationship between dependence remedies, autonomy, and performance
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(Drees & Heugens, 2013). Additionally, entrepreneurial firms are known to face challenges
relating to a lack of resources necessary for the survival of the firm, but questions remain
regarding the potential rewards and drawbacks to seeking resources in the external environment
(e.g., Hallen et al., 2014). To assess the overall findings on dependence remedies, autonomy, and
performance in entrepreneurship, the review process of other published entrepreneurship reviews
is followed (e.g., Busenitz et al., 2003; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzel, 2015; Marvel, Davis, &
Sproul, 2016). Articles included meet the following criteria: (1) publication in a top-tier
management journal or entrepreneurship-specific journal. Management journals include
Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of International
Business Studies, Management Science, Organization Science, and Strategic Management
Journal. Entrepreneurship journals include Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Journal of
Business Venturing, Journal of Small Business Management, Strategic Entrepreneurship
Journal, Small Business Economics, and Entrepreneurship and Regional Development; and (2)
Keywords include one of: entrepreneur(s), entrepreneurial, entrepreneurship, founder(s),
opportunity, opportunities, (new) venture, start-up, or startup, AND any of the keywords
alliance(s), merger(s), acquisition(s), joint venture(s), board(s) of directors, director interlock(s),
board composition, inter-organizational relationship, or bridging, AND any of the keywords
autonomy, performance, or success. Following Shepherd et al. (2015), the term “small business”
is not included, as small businesses may be entrepreneurial, but being a small business does not
necessarily make the firm entrepreneurial (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Using ABI/Inform
Complete, this search produces 275 articles. To best understand the theoretical and empirical
contributions to the literature, teaching cases, editorials, review articles, meta-analyses, and
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spurious results are removed. A majority of studies found in the search results do not relate to the
specific literature being reviewed due to certain keywords being used in multiple literatures,
producing numerous results dealing with established firms or unrelated phenomena. 1 This
reduces the total number of articles to 93.
Remedies, Autonomy, and Outcomes in Table 2.1
Table 2.1 contains all the articles reviewed and the material relevant to the research
questions presented in Chapter I of this dissertation, including the basis and structure of the
remedy used for dependence, the classification and treatment (if any) of autonomy, and the
theoretical lens of the study. Examining these issues provides an overall understanding of the
literature in environmental dependence and uncovers several key findings. The next sections
present a more detailed discussion of the findings in Table 2.1 and progress as follows. First,
remedies for dependence will be discussed according to the structure of the remedy and then the
type of remedy. Second, the literature describing the relationship between remedies and
performance is presented. Finally, the role of autonomy in dependence remedies and the
relationship between autonomy and performance will be discussed.
Joint Ventures and Alliances
Firms engage in joint ventures and alliances with other firms to gain access to resources
in the external environment and attempt to remedy dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
However, early research on alliances between firms finds little to no benefit accruing to firms in
Use of the term “venture” produces numerous articles about joint ventures that are irrelevant for this review and
otherwise absent in the search results. Including the term is necessary, though, to capture many relevant studies.
For example, the phrase “new high-tech ventures” would otherwise be omitted from results, but is relevant for
this review. Additionally, the terms “success” and “opportunity” produces several articles that are otherwise
unrelated to the review (e.g., CEO succession), but are necessary to capture relevant studies. One retracted study
is also eliminated (Ernst, Lichtenthaler, & Vogt, 2011). Finally, studies focusing on established businesses are also
excluded (many of these also fall into the irrelevant results produced by the terms “venture” and “opportunity”).
This is in line with published reviews of entrepreneurship as well as the description of entrepreneurship as
exploiting opportunities and involving decisions about the value of resources (Shane & Venkatraman, 2000).
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the alliance. While alliances and joint ventures are found to be most frequently used for
accessing new markets and distribution channels (McCann, 1991), research also finds no
relationship between IORs and performance (Golden & Dollinger, 1993) and that new ventures
outperform joint ventures (Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994). Bantel (1998) also examines
firms utilizing alliances as a form of strategy, finding very few positive results. Firms utilizing
alliances as the main component of their strategy are found to compete in mature product
markets, produce low levels of growth and market development, and are inefficient. Overall,
Bantel (1998) finds these firms lacking in a clear strategy and having poor prospects. However,
early non-findings and negative findings are contradicted by additional research that
demonstrates benefits accruing to entrepreneurial firms engaging in alliances.
Entrepreneurial firms must typically focus on specific goals or possess certain
characteristics to benefit from alliances or joint ventures. For example, Larson (1991) finds that
entrepreneurial firms partnering together benefit from information exchange, joint forecasting,
collaborative R&D, and improved innovation. Alliances providing such benefits to
entrepreneurial firms are considered to be highly salient resources for the development of the
firm (Lichenstein & Brush, 2001). Multiple studies examine one or more of these aspects of
alliances. Baum and Silverman (2004) examine several firm characteristics and their relationship
with the firm’s ability to acquire venture capital. Results suggest that firms engaging in alliances,
as well as possessing higher levels of human capital, increase the likelihood of acquiring venture
capital (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Alliances are also shown to improve financial performance.
For example, social capital in the form of linkages between entrepreneurs and the Israeli military
defense leads to higher sales revenue (Honig et al., 2006). Firms also seek alliances to remedy
several internal and external challenges. Firms with less financial slack, lower numbers of
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products in their pipeline, lower quality scientific teams, weaker patent positions, higher
competitive environments, or less attractive financing environments seek of alliances to
overcome these challenges (Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds, & Bradley, 2008).
Entrepreneurial firms may also participate in multiple alliances simultaneously. Alliance
networks constitute all current firm alliances and research finds numerous benefits related to
alliance networks. Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman (2000) investigate the scope and efficiency
of alliance networks present at firm founding. Results suggest that efficiently organized networks
provide inexpensive and easier access to information and capabilities. Firms seeking alliances
with rivals may also gain additional learning opportunities and reduce potential future threats
(Baum et al., 2000). Indeed, Koka and Prescott (2008) show that entrepreneurial alliance
networks based on information brokerage and access to diverse information outperform
prominent alliance networks consisting of affiliations with other prominent firms after regulatory
change. Alliance networks also provide access to resources, as firms may also be able to access
new markets provided by an alliance partner (Koka & Prescott, 2008), or reduce the time to IPO
when a larger network is present (Sea, 2004).
Firms in alliance networks may also influence other firms due to their position in the
network. Scholars examining network position often focus on structural holes. Structural holes
are network positions that allow for the brokerage of resources between other members of the
network (Burt, 1997). Entrepreneurial teams that reside in structural holes of their network are
shown to lead to venture performance, and can also be a complement for functional diversity
(Vissa & Chacar, 2009). Lechner and Leyronas (2012) also examine structural holes present in
alliance networks. Results suggest that firms can utilize structural holes to access the resources
present in a regional cluster, leading to firm performance. Relatedly, firms located in central
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network positions also receive benefits from their network position. Network centrality is shown
to have a positive and direct effect on new product performance (Soh, 2003), and to moderate the
relationship between EO and firm performance (Stam & Elfring, 2008). In this context, repeated
partnerships are also positively related to new product performance (Soh, 2003), and bridging
ties also moderate the relationship between EO and firm performance (Stam & Elfring, 2008). In
related work, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) examine firm networks, showing that firms can take a
proactive approach to reducing dependence by organizing around key industry structures. Firms
able to stake out a central location in a network and create multiple ties around uncertainty in an
industry create better performing individual ties (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009).
Entrepreneurial firms also seek alliances in international contexts. Some early research on
joint ventures and alliances examine these IORs in transition and developing countries. Artisien
and Buckley (1985) conduct an exploratory study of firms entering into joint ventures in
Yugoslavia. Results show that Western firms partnering with Yugoslavian firms sought growth
and profits, but did not report the realization of profits. D’Souza and McDougall (1989) present
one possible explanation for the achievement of growth but not profits. Joint ventures in
developing countries are said to lead to performance when there is fit between the needs of the
country and the resource advantages of the entering firm (D’Souza &McDougall, 1989).
International alliances can also lead to growth in transition economies, but in this case, domestic
firms experience growth when they can produce low-cost and high-quality products (Malo &
Norus, 2009). Performance in transition economies is also shown to require commitment and
cooperation between firms that have not traditionally engaged in such behaviors (Fink & Harris,
2012). Research often finds that international alliances are beneficial when knowledge is
obtained. For example, international alliances with local partners can provide the local
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knowledge needed to remedy a lack of resources and capabilities when expanding internationally
(Lu & Beamish, 2001). The host country experience of local partners helps firms overcome a
liability of foreignness and increases profitability in international joint ventures, but decreases
their longevity as the international partner gains their local knowledge (Lu & Beamish, 2006).
Acquiring new knowledge in the form of technical skills, managerial skills, or knowledge of
product or market development is shown to lead to overall firm performance in international
outsourcing arrangements (Li, Wei, & Liu, 2010). Entrepreneurial orientation also benefits firm
performance in specific foreign markets, particularly when firm capabilities match the resource
sought in the alliance (Brouthers, Nakos, & Dimitratos, 2014). However, not all international
alliances are productive. Firms seeking product innovation are shown to experience negative
performance when engaging in a strategic alliance for product development, as international
partners from transition economies likely lack the experience to capitalize on such a relationship
(Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001).
Mergers and Acquisitions
Firms entering into alliances or joint ventures to secure resources may also choose to
acquire resources by acquiring or merging with other firms. While entrepreneurial firms are less
likely to acquire other firms simply due to their size and lack of resources, mergers and
acquisitions are still notable phenomena. In an examination of causes of firm growth, Fusser and
Willard (1990) find that high-growth firms are more likely to have originated in business
incubators and that high and low growth firms do not differ in making acquisitions. While
entrepreneurial firms may not acquire many firms, they are often targets of acquisitions. These
acquisitions produce synergies that may otherwise be unavailable due to the size and scope of
entrepreneurial forms (Brush, 1996). Acquired firms are likely to increase their market share as
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they gain operational synergy with their acquirer. If acquired firms are also able to gain financial
synergies, those synergies are likely to create greater value than operational synergies (Brush,
1996). Further, synergies are likely to be found when firm resources are complementary, rather
than similar (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). The combination of complementary
resources may create valuable and unique synergy, opportunities for learning, the development
of new capabilities, and sustainable competitive advantages (Harrison et al., 2001).
Board of Director Interlocks and Composition
Entrepreneurial firms often remedy financial dependence by exchanging equity and board
of directors seats in exchange for funding needed to grow the firm (Nelson, 2003). This
phenomenon receives considerable attention from scholars seeking to understand the effects of
funding and the additional resources that can be utilized through such relationships. While early
research simply sought to determine the role of boards in venture capital backed firms, finding
that such boards are more likely to be involved in the formation and evaluation of the firm
(Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998), research quickly advanced to more specific topics.
Board size, which receives considerable attention in the strategy literature (e.g., Dalton,
Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999), is also studied in the entrepreneurial context. Daily and
Dalton (1993) find that firms with more directors overall and more outside directors’ experience
higher sales revenue and growth, as these directors bring access to resources in the external
environment. Board size is also associated with IPO performance, as larger boards signal firm
quality and help to prevent IPO underpricing (Certo et al., 2001).
The composition of the board of directors also affects and is affected by several firm
characteristics. Powerful CEOs are proposed to appoint board members for resource needs, while
financiers are proposed to appoint members for institutional or agency reasons. As such, board
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composition can be heavily influenced by the firm’s situation at founding, reflecting the goals of
powerful actors in the firm (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). The presence of original top
management team (TMT) members can also produce positive outcomes that may remedy
financial dependence. Post-IPO firms are shown to experience higher market performance when
original TMT members are present and external board members can provide advice and counsel
(Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). Additional research suggests that boards should have a specific
range of original TMT members on the board. Original TMT members on the board of post-IPO
firms have an inverted-U shaped relationship with stock market returns, such that returns
increase substantially as membership rises from 50-75%, but then decreases (Walters, Kroll, &
Wright, 2010).
Boards of directors are also tasked with monitoring the firm. While monitoring is not
typically a remedy for dependence, the relationship between monitoring and performance is
unclear and at least one study suggests that monitoring may be a resource. Kroll et al. (2007) find
that monitoring by board members does not increase performance, but Garg (2013) argues for a
more precise relationship. Boards with venture capital appointments in place are proposed to
substitute for the resource provision task of directors, bringing experience and skills in
monitoring that improves performance. An inverted-U shaped relationship between venture
board monitoring and performance is proposed (Garg, 2013).
Finally, boards play a key role in family firms as well. The presence of nonfamily board
members provides access to external resources and sources of information that allow a family
firm to expand (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012). Family firms seeking international
expansion benefit from nonfamily board members, as nonfamily board representation has a
positive relationship with the scale and scope of family firm internationalization (Arregle et al.,
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2012). The board can also assist with difficult leadership transitions in family firms. Outside
board members can assist in leadership transitions by providing resources and information that
can alleviate constraints brought about by the family tradition associated with the firm (Yoo,
Schenkel, & Kim, 2014). Specific results show that non-first-son successors to family firms that
interact with outside board members experience positive firm performance from doing so (Yoo
et al., 2014).
Overall, research finds various positive outcomes accruing to firms that engage in IORs
to remedy dependence. As described above, significant research examines IORs and their
outcomes in terms of the structure of the IOR. While the board of directors is frequently used to
acquire financial resources (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1993), alliances, joint ventures, and
acquisitions are all used to acquire various types of non-financial resources. However, there can
be significant differences between types of non-financial resources. For example, Cai, Hughes,
and Yin (2014) examine the purchase, attraction, and development of resources and the effect of
each on performance. However, firms in the sample are widely distributed in industries such as
manufacturing, construction and real estate, computer service and software, and biology (Cai et
al., 2014). Clearly, the purchase, attraction, or development of resources within each of those
industries varies greatly. For example, developing real estate involves entirely different factors
than developing computer software. Others utilize a specific industry to draw a sample (e.g.,
Gabrielsson, 2007; Zahra & Hayton, 2008; Raymond, Marchand, St-Pierre, Cadieux, & Labelle,
2013), giving varying degrees of attention to the specific nature of the industry or resource.
Ignoring the specific nature of resources being developed, acquired, or purchased by firms
creates a potential problem, as different resource types in each of these industries can be
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substantially different. The next section reviews the literature that examines resource dependence
remedies according to the type of resource being sought.
Remedies for Specific Resource Dependencies
The first column of interest in Table 2.1 considers the various types of dependence
remedies explored in extant research. Katila et al. (2008) categorize dependencies based on the
type of resource required by a firm. Financial resources are described as access to capital by
newer firms that allow a firm to prosper (Katila et al., 2008). Complementary resources are
necessary operational resources possessed by established firms, but lacking in entrepreneurial
firms. Complementary resources are also non-financial resources not typically provided by
investors such as venture capital or private equity firms. Additionally, results suggest that
complementary resource dependence remedies vary in their level of commitment. In this case,
commitment refers to the scarcity and inimitability of the resource being sought. Higher
commitment complementary remedies describe resources such as manufacturing capabilities or
R&D, which are costly, difficult to develop, and not widely available. Conversely, lower
commitment complementary remedies describe resources such as marketing resources, human
resource services, or basic supply agreements. Accordingly, the type of remedy examined within
a particular article was classified as either (1) financial, (2) high commitment complementary, or
(3) low commitment complementary.
High commitment resource dependence remedies. Entrepreneurial firms often lack
the resources necessary to fully commercialize their products (Teece, 1986). Forming alliances to
access high commitment resources, such as manufacturing resources, can thus remedy this
dependence and allow firms to grow and develop. Firms are proposed to perform best in
manufacturing alliances when working to utilize their strengths. D’Souza and McDougall (1989)
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propose that smaller firms entering into manufacturing joint ventures may do well by seeking
partners in developing countries. The existence of fit between the focal firm and the needs of the
developing country and firm should lead to success for the focal firm. Joint ventures in
developing countries may also be attractive to smaller firms as a lack of cutting-edge technology
may not hinder the ability to find venture partners or experience success (D’Souza &
McDougall, 1989).
However, empirical results do not offer an entirely clear explanation of the outcomes of
manufacturing alliances. Partnerships between entrepreneurial firms can be a substitute for
vertical integration, granting access to R&D and manufacturing resources that may otherwise be
out of reach (Larson, 1991), but such results of such partnerships may be difficult to understand.
Golden and Dollinger (1993) examine IORs between small manufacturing firms, finding no
relationship between IORs and firm performance. Indeed, in some instances, profit margins
decrease due to IORs. The authors speculate that IORs may be used as a form of satisficing,
whereby partners accept a lower level of performance in exchange for higher levels of certainty
(Golden & Dollinger, 1993). Inkpen and Crossan (1995) offer some possible explanation for
non-findings related to IORs, finding that organizational learning in joint ventures is often
hindered by inflexible managerial beliefs. Management that can identify gaps in knowledge and
also adjust current beliefs when presented with new evidence is more likely to learn and benefit
from IORs in manufacturing contexts (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). McGee, Dowling, and
Megginson (1995) examine similar cooperative agreements, shedding some light on other
uncertain findings. Results show that cooperative arrangements for manufacturing and R&D
benefit firm performance most when the founding team has manufacturing experience.
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Manufacturing alliances are also studies in international contexts, as many emerging
countries offer the opportunity to manufacture quality products at low prices (Malo & Norris,
2009). Examining alliances from the view of manufacturing firms, Malo and Norris (2009) find
that manufacturers based in transition economies are successful when forming previously
unavailable international alliances allowing for the sale of low-cost, high-quality products. Li et
al. (2010) also examine firms in emerging countries, focusing on manufacturers that perform
outsourcing for firms from developed countries. As more advanced processes are outsourced
these firms have the opportunity to learn from their foreign partners and improve performance.
Results show that high market orientation and EO lead to knowledge acquisition, and that
knowledge acquisition leads to firm performance (Li et al., 2010).
Overall, while entrepreneurial firms do in fact obtain high commitment resources via
IORs, the success of such IORs remain in question. Issues related to management beliefs (Inkpen
& Crossan, 1995), experience (McGee et al., 1995), and the type of economy in which a firm
resides (Li et al., 2010) all effect outcomes of IORs for high commitment resources. This wide
range of specific contextual factors creates a challenge for understanding the general
phenomenon.
Low commitment resource dependence remedies. Low commitment resources
represent resources that are important to the development of the firm but are more readily
available and easy to access, thus requiring a lower level of commitment to be secured. One such
resource frequently examined in the literature is marketing resources. Marketing alliances
provide specific resources to entrepreneurial firms, typically assisting with access to new
markets or channels of distribution that were otherwise unavailable, creating the potential for
growth (McCann, 1991). Baum et al. (2000) describe similar resources being available through
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downstream marketing alliances, such as market access and distribution infrastructure. Access to
markets and means to distribute to those markets provides opportunities for the growth and
development of the firm. Accessing such resources through marketing alliances is likely to
increase revenue growth as well as employment and R&D spending (Baum et al., 2000).
Brouthers et al. (2014) examine international performance stemming from marketing
alliances. While marketing alliances improve performance in general, results show that the
capabilities possessed by the firm play a large role in the success of a particular alliance. Firms
possessing marketing capabilities increased performance when engaging in marketing alliances,
more so than firms without marketing capabilities. The same relationship is found for firms with
research capabilities engaging in research alliances (Brouthers et al., 2014).
One study also examines marketing relationships between local development agencies
and entrepreneurs in their area (Izquierdo, Carrion, & Gutierrez, 2008). Relational exchange
between agencies and entrepreneurs represents a form of social capital. In this study, firms assist
with economic development goals in exchange for relationships with other key stakeholders,
such as government agencies and other groups. Relational exchange with entrepreneurs is shown
to promote the goals of local development agencies and increases firm competitiveness and
managerial efficiency (Izquierdo et al., 2008). Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) find that strong ties
between an entrepreneurial firm and a large firm reduce uncertainty and provide access to
distribution channels that can be critical to success. Further, achieving success is found to create
opportunities for additional alliances that access new distribution channels (Ozcan & Eisenhardt,
2009).
Compared to high commitment resources, research on low commitment resources
appears to present a clearer picture of the relationship between acquiring such resources and
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performance. Firms acquiring access to marketing resources are often available to increase
revenues (McCann, 1991), and may find additional opportunities through the building of
relationships (Izquierdo et al., 2008). Growing firm revenues may also allow for further
development of the firm in other areas, such as R&D spending (Baum et al., 2000).
Financial resource dependence remedies. Some firms can reduce the need for external
financial resources through internal actions. For example, Levitas and McFayden (2009) find that
patent activity and exploitation alliances decrease the need for capital. These activities tend to
maximize profits, making firms less likely to seek financing (Levitas & McFayden, 2009).
However, most entrepreneurial firms do require access to external capital at some point, and
many scholars have investigated how firms attract and acquire funding.
One stream of research studies the characteristics or actions of firms that make them
more likely to obtain external financing. One study finds straightforward results, suggesting that
simply offering better terms to venture capitalists and investigating numerous options improves
the possibility of acquiring funding (Hustedde & Pulver, 1992). However, the resources and
actions of firms rightfully receive more attention. Human capital is found to support venture
capital, although Baum and Silverman (2004) find that venture capitalists may over-value human
capital, as founding team human capital is shown to have a negative or non-significant
relationship with outcomes such as revenues and R&D expenditures (Baum & Silverman, 2004).
Human capital is not found, however, to increase the odds of securing funding through
crowdfunding sources (Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther, & Schweizer, 2015). Technical knowledge,
though, is found to contribute to the acquisition of venture capital. Honig et al. (2006) find that
firm knowledge gained through spillovers increases the chances of receiving venture capital, and
Baum and Silverman (2004) find a similar relationship when a firm possesses patents.
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Research examining the relationship between alliances and the acquisition of venture
capital also finds conflicting results based on the type of financing sought. Baum and Silverman
(2004) find that engaging in downstream or horizontal alliances increases the likelihood of
acquiring venture capital. However, Ahlers et al. (2015) find that alliance capital in the form of
non-executive board members does not increase the possibility of obtaining equity
crowdfunding.
Entrepreneurial firms further advanced in the firm life cycle may have the option of
conducting an Initial Public Offering (IPO) to remedy financial dependence. Several studies
examine the success of IPOs in specific contexts. First, independent boards may be beneficial to
family firms after an IPO. Family firms often underperform the market post-IPO, but governance
from an independent board reduces the negative performance (Ehrhardt & Nowak, 2003).
Second, the ethnic proximity of VCs to their funded firms is positively related to successful
IPOs, acquisitions, and net profits after IPO (Hegde & Tumlinson, 2014). Finally, firms seeking
an IPO in a foreign country benefit from the advice and counsel of an independent board, leading
to a more successful IPO (Bell et al., 2012).
While not as common as venture capital-related research, some studies examine financial
dependence remedies in conjunction with other important events. For example, public firms are
shown to occasionally exit public markets (Zahra, 1995). Firms exiting public markets eliminate
the scrutiny attached to the market, but must utilize alternative financial remedies to do so. By
utilizing leveraged buyouts, firms can increase corporate entrepreneurship and firm performance
(Zahra, 1995). Entrepreneurs also use financial remedies to exit their firms entirely.
Entrepreneurial age and human capital lead to different types of intended exit by the entrepreneur
(DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). Older entrepreneurs are more likely to choose family succession or
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liquidation, compared to a more traditional financial remedy such as an IPO or exit after
acquisition (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012).
Remedies and Performance
A recent meta-analysis by Drees and Heugens (2013) supports the idea that resource
dependence remedies are positively related to firm performance. However, some contradictory
findings exist (e.g., Koka & Prescott, 2008), and among positive results, not all remedies are
shown to produce equal performance outcomes (Drees & Heugens, 2013). To help clarify the
findings present in the literature, this section reviews the relationship between dependence
remedies and performance. Relevant summaries are shown in the last column of Table 2.1.
Board of Director Interlocks, Composition, and Performance
Several studies examine performance relating to the board of directors. As boards are
often associated with venture capital research and financial remedies, the boards’ effect on IPO
performance is often a topic of investigation. Board independence is shown to lead to foreign
IPO success (Bell et al., 2012), and board size helps prevent IPO underpricing (Certo et al.,
2001). Firms that have recently completed an IPO experience positive stock market returns when
original TMT members are present on the board and receive advice from outside members (Kroll
et al., 2007). The ratio of original TMT members on the board also affects post-IPO stock market
returns. Returns are highest when the original TMT holds a majority of seats (over 50%), but not
an overwhelming majority (under 75%) (Walter et al., 2010).
Boards also assist with financial performance. Daily and Dalton (1993) find that board
size and higher numbers of outside directors leads to sales revenue and growth. One study
examines financial performance as an antecedent to board behavior (i.e., Gabrielsson, 2007).
Contrary to expected findings, strong past performance has a negative relationship with
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monitoring and resource provision by the boards of directors. Results suggest that boards may
avoid becoming involved when performance is strong, but feel they should intervene when
performance is weak (Gabrielsson, 2007). Additionally, Garg (2013) proposes that venture
boards, boards with venture capital appointments in place, can be a substitute for the resource
provision task of directors as they may bring experience and skills in monitoring that improve
performance. Thus, an inverted-U shaped relationship between venture board monitoring and
performance is proposed (Garg, 2013). Finally, outside directors can also assist firms in
leadership transitions, providing advice to non-first-son successors in family businesses that then
leads to performance (Yoo et al., 2014). Overall, findings suggest that skilled and experienced
board members with the intent to improve firm performance are likely to succeed at doing so.
Researchers also examine non-financial performance brought on by the board of
directors. For example, industrial firms that may pollute the environment may be dependent on
public opinion and regulatory issues related to their operations. Boards comprised of legal
experts and active CEOs are shown to improve the environmental performance of industrial
firms by lowering the overall pollution emitted by plants in populated areas (de Villiers, Naiker,
& van Staden, 2011). Non-profit organizations concerned with improving social performance
may benefit from entrepreneurial orientation (EO) provided by the board of directors. EO is
found to increase market-based funding of the NPO as well as social performance of the
organization (Coombes, Morris, Allen, & Webb, 2011).
IORs and Performance
Reviewing the literature in entrepreneurship and IORs produces several themes
about how such IORs lead to performance. Firm performance in international settings is
frequently examined separately from domestic settings, as firms entering new foreign markets or
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working with new foreign partners often exhibit a liability of foreignness. Despite this liability,
research finds numerous ways in which firms can be successful in international settings. First,
one study suggests that expanding internationally is best done via new ventures (Woodcock,
Beamish, & Makino, 1994). New ventures are shown to outperform joint ventures for such
expansion, and both new ventures and joint ventures are shown to outperform acquisitions
(Woodcock et al., 1994). Other studies suggest that factors beyond the structure of foreign entry
influence performance. Firms with local joint venture partners that possess experience in the host
country can increase their profitability, but decreases the survival of the joint venture (Lu &
Beamish, 2006). As firms gain the local knowledge of their partner, the necessity of the joint
venture decreases, leading to a higher likelihood of it dissolving (Lu & Beamish, 2006). Zahra
and Hayton (2008) also find that learning plays a critical role in international contexts,
demonstrating that absorptive capacity positively influences the relationship between
international alliances and firm performance. International opportunities are also present for
firms in transition economies (Malo & Norris, 2009). By forming international alliances to
manufacture low-cost products, transition economy firms experience performance in sales
growth (Malo & Norris, 2009).
While some early research on IORs in entrepreneurial settings found no relationship
between IORs and performance (e.g., Golden & Dollinger, 1993), the majority of studies find a
positive relationship (e.g., Certo et al., 2001). Baum et al. (2000) find that marketing alliances
lead to revenue growth, and alliances with organizations such as universities or research
institutes improve patenting and R&D performance (Baum et al., 2000). Other studies also find a
positive relationship between alliance networks and performance. Koka and Prescott (2008)
examine the nature of alliance networks, finding that entrepreneurial networks outperform

43

prominent networks in terms of sales per employee even during times of incremental change. A
positive relationship also holds in transition economies, where cooperation and self-commitment
lead to performance (Fink & Harris, 2012). Alliance entrepreneurship, defined as pro-actively
seeking and evaluating alliance opportunities, leads to market share, sales growth, market
development, and product development. (Sarkar, Echambadi, & Harrison, 2001). Small firms in
uncertain environments experience even greater performance when engaging in alliance
entrepreneurship (Sarkar et al., 2001). These pro-active, thought-out processes to creating
alliance networks are demonstrated in the qualitative study by Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009).
Firms in the emerging wireless gaming industry performed best when they created alliance
networks throughout the industry, strategically creating numerous partners and to avoid
dependence on any one alliance (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009).
Fit and performance. Studies also examine the relationship between firm resources and
those of their alliance partners. D’Souza and McDougall (1989) find that fit between firm
advantages present at multiple levels and the needs of their joint venture partners in developing
countries leads to higher performance. This relationship is also found in the fit between
management experience and the type of alliance formed by a firm (McGee, Dowling, &
Megginson, 1995). For example, marketing alliances produce higher performance when firm
management possesses marketing experience (McGee et al., 1995). Finally, in a related concept,
Harrison et al. (2001) find that complementary resources between firms are critical to the success
of alliances and acquisitions.
Network position and performance. Network position is also shown to lead to
performance. Network centrality is shown to lead to new product development performance
(Soh, 2003) and also to moderate the relationship between EO and firm performance (Stam &
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Elfring, 2008). Vissa and Chacar (2009) also find positive outcomes stemming from a firm’s
network position, as structural holes are shown to lead to increases in revenue. Firms also
experience higher performance when they conduct network brokerage as part of participation in
industry events (Stam, 2010). Firms filling structural holes in their networks are also often able
to leverage their position for positive performance. Lechner and Leyronas (2012) find that
structural holes are important for clustered firms and lead to higher revenue.
Learning and performance. Learning and knowledge are also key factors in
performance related to alliances. Knowledge spillovers taking place during alliances have a
positive relationship with alliance performance and firm performance (Honig et al., 2006; Shu,
Liu, Gao, & Shanley, 2014). Knowledge acquisition resulting from cross-border outsourcing
leads to firm performance (Li et al., 2010). Learning capabilities mediate the relationship
between resource acquisition types and performance (Cai et al., 2014). Managers must be
willing to accept that some of their current knowledge may be wrong to learn from JV partners
(Inkpen & Crossan, 1995).
Innovation and product performance. Innovation is a sought-after goal of many
entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Sampson, 2007), and alliances can help firms seeking innovation.
Larson (1991) finds that entrepreneurial firms can improve innovation performance when
partnering together and sharing information. However, this result is not consistently found.
Jones, Lanctot, and Teegan (2001) find that external technology acquisition has a negative
relationship with product and financial performance. Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001) also find
negative financial performance to be the outcome when firms enter alliance for innovation and
product development.
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Overall, the relationship between IORs and performance suggests that firms benefit from
engaging in relationships with other firms. However, as described above, some mixed results
exist. One explanation for mixed results suggests that autonomy is a key construct in IORs, but is
often ignored (Drees & Huegens, 2013). The next section discusses autonomy, the mechanisms
that provide autonomy, and the relationship between autonomy and performance.
AUTONOMY
Autonomy is an organization’s freedom to make decisions regarding its internal resources
without external influence (Oliver, 1991a). A lack of autonomy causes firms to dedicate
resources to meet demands brought on by external organizations, and firms are ultimately
seeking autonomy through resource dependence remedies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Oliver
(1991a) describes autonomy as having three distinct mechanisms. First, autonomy allows a firm
to meet the demands of multiple external actors simultaneously, preventing resources from being
constrained. Second, autonomy is the ability of a firm to respond to contingencies, insulating
them from unforeseen events that may constrain the flow of resources (Oliver, 1991a). Third,
organizational relationships may create the possibility for opportunistic behavior on the part of a
resource provider that leads to benefits for the resource provider and negative outcomes for the
focal firm (Oliver, 1991a). The next paragraphs review the studies that consider autonomy
according to each of these mechanisms. A summary of how autonomy is treated by articles in
this literature review is contained in Table 2.1.
Mechanisms of Autonomy
Meeting multiple demands simultaneously. Firms seeking autonomy in this way are
attempting to secure other options for access to resources. Lechner and Leyronas (2012) discuss
autonomy in terms of structural holes in the firm’s network. Like Oliver’s (1991a) description of
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autonomy, structural holes are proposed to grant preferential access to resources, bargaining
power, and the ability to change. Structural holes, and thus autonomy, are shown to lead to firm
performance (Lechner & Leyronas, 2012).
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) do not discuss autonomy explicitly but describe a similar
relationship by explaining how firms create alliance networks to reduce dependence that can
exist in dyadic alliances. The performance of individual ties in the portfolio is then stronger as
firms organize around key industry structure, locate centrally, and make ties around uncertainty.
Responding to contingencies. Patzelt et al. (2008) describe firms being dependent on
alliances, suggesting that these firms lack autonomy. This situation arises due a lack of
organizational slack for alliance formation, causing firms to continue to remain committed to
underperforming alliances. While other research examines firms in situations that may allow for
investigation regarding this type of autonomy, no other studies in this review proposed such a
relationship in theory or tested one empirically.
Avoiding opportunistic behavior. Some studies approach autonomy from a very
simplistic viewpoint. Gales and Blackburn (1990) consider the perceived autonomy of retailers
dealing with suppliers. While suppliers may have control over critical resources, frequent
communication between suppliers and retailers leads to retailers perceiving autonomy (Gales &
Blackburn, 1990). Kanter, Richardson, North, & Morgan (1991) touch upon autonomy in their
study of Eastman Kodak. Proposed projects arising from within the firm were required to
function autonomously, without the need for the manufacturing or other resources currently
controlled by Eastman Kodak (Kanter et al., 1991). In a very simplistic view, Fink and Harris
(2012) consider firms to have autonomy is they are legally independent organizations.

47

Multiple studies consider autonomy in terms of the interdependence present between
firms. Lichenstein and Brush (2001) propose that interdependence arises from resource salience.
As their findings show that the salience of resources changes over time in entrepreneurial firms,
interdependence can also shift from one resource provider to answer. Koka and Prescott (2008)
view interdependence as beneficial to firms in cooperative alliances, as it leads to higher quality
exchange. Developing from a high level of resource commitment, interdependence enables
effective transactions between partners and fosters the flow of information (Koka & Prescott,
2008). In a contrary approach, Benghozi and Salvador (2014) assume that autonomy is lost
during traditional partnerships between firms.
Autonomy and Performance
Meta-analysis finds that resource dependence remedies are likely to increase firm
performance through the mediating mechanism of autonomy (Drees & Huegens, 2013). This
section discusses articles found in the literature review search results that investigate that
relationship. A summary of the results of each study, whether or not autonomy is considered, is
found in the last column of Table 2.1.
Gales and Blackburn (1990) examine the relationship between autonomy and various
operational performance outcomes. While the authors initially argued that frequent and intense
communication between retailers and supplier would lead to less autonomy, results show that
such communication may reduce uncertainty in the relationship and preserve retailers’ ability to
act. Autonomy then leads to increases in planning, advertising, promotional activity, and
decreases in uncertainty (Gales & Blackburn, 1990).
Lechner and Leyronas (2012) examine the autonomy of a firm in a network. Like Gales
and Blackburn (1990), Lechner and Leyronas (2012) argue that autonomy is related to accessing
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valuable information. Additionally, autonomy provides preferential access to resources that then
lead to firm performance (Lechner & Leyronas, 2012). Fink and Harris (2012) also find that
autonomy is one aspect of alliance commitment that leads to an index of firm performance
measures, including employee performance, sales performance, and customer satisfaction. It
should be noted, though, that autonomy was only one of 17 items in the questionnaire measuring
alliance commitment (Fink & Harris, 2012).
A small number of studies examine the relationship between autonomy and performance,
demonstrating its importance to the literature on resource dependence remedies. However,
autonomy is found to mediate the relationship between resource dependence remedies and firm
performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013), making it a key concept in the literature. The lack of
substantial research that considers the role of autonomy in IORs that seek to remedy dependence
is problematic for the understanding of such relationships, as it may potentially explain negative
or non-findings in the literature, or add further explanatory power to the reasons and conditions
that lead firms to seek IORs to remedy dependence.
CONCLUSION
Research examining dependence, autonomy, and remedies for dependence in
entrepreneurial firms is deep in some areas, such as financial remedies mostly relating to venture
capital and alliances seeking out critical resources. However, it is shown to be lacking in other
areas, especially regarding the study of autonomy. As resource dependence is shown to be
especially relevant to entrepreneurial settings (Daily et al., 2002) and firms seeking to remedy
dependence are ultimately seeking autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the lack of studies
considering autonomy represents a large deficiency in the literature. This is especially true given
that entrepreneurial firms often lack required resources and must engage in various IORs to
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access financial and complementary resources needed for the development of the firm (Katila et
al., 2008). Entering into these relationships creates a situation ripe for the creation of dependence
by the more powerful firm. Additionally, results of some studies report contradictory
relationships between remedies and performance, suggesting that further research is needed to
better predict and describe the phenomenon. Lastly, while some studies consider resources by
type, others strictly investigate remedies in terms of their structure. Understanding how firms
acquire specific resources and the outcomes of doing so may also shed light on some
contradictory findings. The next chapter presents additional relevant literature covering resource
dependence, autonomy, remedies, and performance. Hypotheses are also developed and
presented.
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CHAPTER III: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Resource Dependence
Resource dependence describes a situation in which a firm heavily relies upon another
firm in its external environment to supply critical inputs (Pfeffer, 1972b; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Bae & Gargiulo, 2004). These social situations are characterized
by interdependencies between firms that limit possible actions and threaten firm survival
(Pfeffer, 1987). Power is a key dynamic underlying these social situations (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Stemming from seminal work in power relations by Emerson (1962) and Thompson
(1967), resource dependence recognizes that firms may have different amounts of power over
each other and that this power may not cancel out (Emerson, 1962). Indeed, Pfeffer (1981)
claims that firms should minimize their dependence on other firms and maximize the dependence
of other firms on them (Pfeffer, 1981). Questions regarding this prescription remain, though, as
implementing coercive strategies can remove any incentive that the dependent firm may have to
work for the mutual benefit of both firms (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Such coercion can lead to
negative performance for the powerful organization (Gulati & Sytch, 2007), rather than the
theorized positive outcomes (Pfeffer, 1981).
Types of Resource Dependence Remedies
As Wry et al. (2013) describe in their review of the resource dependence literature,
prolific empirical evidence supports the idea that firms remedy dependence through IORs.
However, changes in the environment from the 1970s to today suggest that firms consider
remedies beyond those traditionally studied, leading Davis and Cobb (2010) to suggest that the
traditional remedies, such as joint ventures and acquisitions, need to be updated. Relatedly,
studies often examine IORs in terms of the relationship structure (e.g., joint ventures or
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acquisitions) without considering the specific resource being exchanged in the IOR. These issues
are further discussed, and hypotheses are developed below.
Firms frequently seek external resources by engaging IORs with other firms (e.g., Baum
& Silverman, 2004). Given the often public and easily observed nature of IORs such as joint
ventures, acquisitions, and board of director interlocks, it is understandable that scholars often
examine resource dependence by evaluating the outcomes of these IORs. However, research
suggests that firms seek resources in different manners based upon the type of resource being
sought (Katila et al., 2008). Following this line of research, resource dependence remedies are
considered in terms of access to financial resources or complementary resources. Financial
resources represent access to capital and are fungible in nature. Complementary resources
represent operational resources that are necessary for the continued development of the firm and
not typically provided by financial resource providers. For example, venture capital firms
provide financial resources but are unlikely to provide direct access to manufacturing or
marketing resources. The next sections present arguments regarding remedies for financial
resource dependence and complementary resource dependence and develop hypotheses.
Financial Resource Dependence Remedies and Performance
Financial dependence represents the need for outside cash to sustain and grow the firm
(Katila et al., 2008). Few, if any, resources are more crucial to firm survival than access to
capital. This is reflected in both traditional approaches to resource dependence that focus on
large firms and board interlocks (e.g., Pfeffer, 1972c), and more modern approaches involving
entrepreneurial firms and alternatives sources of financing (e.g., Gabrielsson, 2007). The
fungible nature of financial resources delineates financial resource dependence as a unique type
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of resource dependence. This dissertation follows Katila et al. (2008) and defines financial
resource dependence as a lack of financial resources necessary to sustain and grow the firm.
Empirical support for firms requiring financial resources is abundant. Pfeffer (1972c)
shows that firms with higher needs for financial resources are more likely to create linkages with
financial institutions through board of director interlocks to acquire financing. Similarly, Lang
and Lockhart (1990) find that firms whose financial dependence increases respond by increasing
the number of board of director interlocks with financial institutions. These interlocks are widely
used to acquire financial resources, as results show that the simple presence of financial
representation on a board makes a firm more likely to borrow than firms without financial
representation (Mizruchi & Steans, 1994).
However, the traditional focus on director interlocks as a remedy for financial resource
dependence is challenged by observations that anti-trust and banking regulations on modern
firms may prevent such IORs from forming (Drees & Heugens, 2013). Indeed, Davis (1996)
notices a steep decline in bank interlocks in U.S. firms after regulatory changes. These
environmental changes suggest that some traditional resource dependence remedies are in need
of updates (Davis & Cobb, 2010). Venture capital is described by Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and
Muller (2013) as a formal investment (Bruton, Chahine, & Filatotchev, 2009) by professional
investors (Gompers & Lerner 2001) who take an active role in the firm (Sahlman, 1990) and
seek high returns (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007). Firms exchange equity and board of
director seats for cash that can be used to further the goals of the firm (Rosenstein, 1988). The
use of venture capital in addition to and in place of traditional financing has played a role in this
change, as the amount of venture capital available increased substantially over a recent 25-year
period (Puri & Zarutskie, 2012). Indeed, firms often elect the use of venture capital even when
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capital markets may provide the necessary funding (Hoehn-Weiss & Barden, 2014). Younger,
smaller firms are especially likely to seek financing from venture capital firms or similar
alternatives, as financing through formal financial institutions is typically not available (Aldrich
& Auster, 1996). While the mechanism for acquiring financial resources may differ for young
firms compared to the director interlock-assisted borrowing often utilized by established firms,
dependence on such resources remains (Hillman et al., 2009).
Research examining remedies for financial resource dependence has not failed to notice
the use of venture capital, as numerous empirical studies investigate phenomena associated with
venture capital financing. Venture capitalists are shown to target industries with high growth
(Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007), and specific firms demonstrating high potential,
such as a skilled and experienced founding team (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Additionally, as
venture capital provides an infusion of cash to a firm that is by definition in need of such
resources, firms have the opportunity to improve performance by utilizing this cash for
development of the firm. Firms may hire additional employees, acquire assets, launch a product,
or continue potentially valuable R&D after accessing financial resources (Baum & Silverman,
2004). As any remedy for dependence is a means to an end, research frequently examines the
relationship between acquiring venture capital and firm performance. This relationship is shown
to exist in several studies.
Financial resources in the form of venture capital may be acquired in a different manner
than traditional financing, but boards of directors still play a role, as entrepreneurial firms are
often required to appoint outside board members from the venture capital firm as part of any
funding round (Rosenstein, 1988). These directors may also bring benefits to the firm. Daily and
Dalton (1993) study the composition of boards of directors and the effects of outside board
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members. Outside directors are more likely to work in the best interests of the firm and avoid
decisions that may hamper performance, such as golden parachutes or policies that entrench
management. Results show that outside directors lead to higher sales revenue and growth (Daily
& Dalton, 1993). Fried et al. (1998) also suggest that active boards in venture capital backed
firms experience higher performance.
Additional empirical findings also support a positive relationship between acquiring
venture capital and growth (Carlsson, 2002). Indeed, a primary reason firms seek financial
resources is to provide the flexibility needed for growth (Columbo & Grilli, 2010). Venture
capitalists providing financing also typically have screening and monitoring capabilities that
allow for the selection of firms that are more likely to grow (Columbo & Grilli, 2010). Venture
capitalists may also provide strong contractual incentives for firms to work toward growth
(Gompers, 1995; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). Overall, research suggests that venture capital
leads to increases in growth as venture capitalists select promising firms (e.g., Columbo & Grilli,
2010) and also add value to the firm through their expertise (e.g., Dimov & Shepherd, 2005).
Venture capitalists may also create value through the services provided to funded firms
(Wijbenga et al., 2007). By providing assistance when entrepreneurial firms face challenges,
such as cost overruns or lower sales, venture capitalists are likely to improve the financial
performance of the firm (Wijbenga et al., 2007).
Despite the advantage associated with venture capital, some studies fail to find a
relationship between venture capital and firm performance (Busenitz et al., 2004; Jain,
Jayaramen, & Kini, 2008). These divergent results may be the result of evaluating performance
outcomes that are not sought after in the realm of venture capital. As previously stated, venture
capitalist focus on high growth industries (Zacharakis et al., 2007) and many studies find results
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supporting a relationship between venture capital and growth, as previously discussed. Growth is
also found more often than other performance outcomes such as profitability (Rosenbusch et al.,
2013).
Thus, firms seeking venture capital as a financial dependence remedy will have success
when focusing on sales growth.

H1: Financial resource dependence remedies in the form of venture capital funding will
have a positive relationship with sales growth.

Complementary Resource Dependence Remedies
The successful commercialization of products or services by a firm typically requires
complementary resources, consisting of non-financial resources beyond those directly needed for
the product or service itself (Teece, 1986). These resources may require various levels of
investment and commitment depending on the particular resource being sought, as well as by
industry or firm (Katila et al., 2008). For example, a start-up firm that has successfully designed
and patented a new medical device will require the resources needed to produce the device as
well as a sales force tasked with selling the product to doctors, hospitals, and other medical
providers. Conversely, a firm producing a new bottled energy drink will require distribution and
mass marketing resources. The precise list of possible complementary resources a firm will seek
is vast, but resources may be classified according to the level of commitment required for their
acquisition. Following Katila et al. (2008), who find that manufacturing and marketing resources
differ in how they are obtained due to their scarcity and the commitment required by a firm to
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obtain them, this dissertation classifies complementary resources as either high commitment or
low commitment. Hypotheses for each are now developed.
High commitment complementary resource dependence remedies. Complementary
resources requiring high levels of commitment are characterized by higher levels of scarcity
relative to other resources and are typically more difficult to access. For example, Katila et al.
(2008) describe manufacturing resources as having large capital requirements, scarce
availability, and high commitment levels. The level of commitment is especially high for young
firms (Katila et al., 2008). Similarly, Das et al. (1998) also state that acquiring access to
manufacturing resources may be characterized by high fixed costs and also lack alternatives,
creating high levels of commitment. High commitment levels from young firms can create
dependent situations as firms may be locked in and unable to secure manufacturing from an
alternative provider in the short-term. Indeed, manufacturers seeking to reduce their uncertainty
related to the success of products may seek long-term contracts from firms seeking their services
(Gerwin, 1993).
Despite the costs associated with accessing high commitment resources such as
manufacturing, firms continue to engage in IORs to access manufacturing due to the possible
benefits. For example, firms experienced in R&D tend to realize increased firm performance
when entering into alliances to secure R&D resources (McGee et al., 1995). Additionally, the
high fixed costs associated with alliances may be reduced due to economies of scale and scope,
transaction costs may be reduced, and smaller partners in manufacturing alliances are found to
receive greater benefits than the larger partner (Das et al., 1998). Alliances that are strategically
important and provide access to complementary resources are also found to lead to firm growth
(Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). As such alliances provide access to previously unavailable
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resources that can be immediately utilized, performance quickly results (Lunnan & Haugland,
2008). Manufacturing alliances, in particular, are likely to be strategic for young or start-up
firms, as they allow for greater control of the manufacturing process (Park et al., 2002). Finally,
non-corporate ventures seeking manufacturing resources are also likely to experience higher
growth when acquiring the resources via an alliance, as opposed to vertical integration (Zahra &
George, 1999). Thus:

H2: Firms that enter into IORs that grant access to high commitment complementary
resources will have a positive relationship with sales growth.

Low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies. Katila et al. (2008)
describe the nature of marketing resources as one specific low commitment complementary
resource. Marketing resources are typically available in greater numbers or amounts than high
commitment resources such as manufacturing (Das et al, 1998) and are thus unlikely to require
large capital investments up-front or high levels of commitment. Such low commitment
resources are thus available without entering into a high commitment IOR (Katila et al., 2008).
One low commitment resource, marketing resources, is shown to create value for firms
in alliances in three ways (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009). First, firms may be able to access
new markets provided by an alliance partner (Koka & Prescott, 2008), creating the possibility for
additional growth. Second, firms may be able to utilize brands or products that were previously
unavailable, granting the opportunity to widen markets in which the firm is already active
(Kalaignanam, Shankar, & Varadarajan 2007). Finally, firms may be accessing resources that
they previously lacked (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). For example, technology firms that have
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focused purely on product development may have no internal resources available for marketing
that product. Accessing such resources may lead to lower costs and increase cash flow compared
to developing such resources internally (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009). Chatterjee (2004)
explains that accessing such resources is especially relevant to entrepreneurial firms, who
otherwise may not be able to access new markets or reach economies of scale.
However, empirical results supporting a link between low commitment resource
dependence remedies and performance are not universal. Das et al. (1998) find no relationship
between marketing alliances and performance measured as the cumulative abnormal stock
returns in the period following a marketing alliance announcement. However, stock market
reactions and other studies that evaluate the perceived benefits of alliances (e.g., Kale et al.,
2002) fail to capture the actual business-level outcomes that result from alliances and the
utilization of resources (Das et al., 1998).Overall, low commitment resources are likely to
facilitate the development of the firm in a manner that allows for the full commercialization of a
product or service (Teece, 1986), which is likely to lead to the growth of the firm (Das et al.,
1998). Thus:

H3: Firms that enter into IORs that grant access to low commitment complementary
resources will have a positive relationship with sales growth.

Autonomy as Mediation
Research in resource dependence does not exclusively examine organizational outcomes
through a profit-seeking lens (Oliver, 1991b), although many studies have taken such an
approach (e.g. Pfeffer, 1972b; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Weitz & Shenhav, 2000). By
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assuming a profit-seeking motive by organizations, RDT aligns itself with strategic management
in attempting to explain differences in performance outcomes (Oliver, 1991b). Autonomy is thus
a critical construct in resource dependence research, as it is shown to mediate the relationship
between dependence remedies and performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013).
Firms seeking remedies for dependence are ultimately seeking autonomy (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). Autonomy is an organization’s freedom to make decisions regarding its internal
resources without external influence (Oliver, 1991a). A lack of autonomy causes organizations to
dedicate resources to meet demands brought on by external organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Thus, firms seek out autonomy through environmental management. Oliver’s (1991a)
broad definition of autonomy coincides with the treatment autonomy has received in the
literature. However, various treatments of autonomy in the literature suggest that it also appears
likely to possess different characteristics depending on the resource sought by the firm. Oliver
(1991a) describes autonomy as having three mechanisms that could lead to a positive
relationship with firm performance. Each of these mechanisms is discussed below, and
hypotheses relating to each are developed.
Responding to Contingencies
One mechanism underlying autonomy is the ability for a firm to respond to
contingencies, insulating it from unforeseen events that may constrain the flow of resources
(Oliver, 1991a). Successfully responding to contingencies allows an organization to maintain
relationships that become strained due to changes in the environment. For example, Beekun and
Ginn (1993) find that hospitals adjust their linkages with other organizations in order to maintain
resources that matched their strategy, based on environmental uncertainty. The changing
demands of a key stakeholder may also produce contingencies. Ingram and Simons (1995) find
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that firms respond to the demand for work-family considerations when other organizations also
responded, or when female managers at the firm demand change.
Contingencies can also take a simpler form. Firms that sell products or services on credit
to buyers must deal with the uncertainty that arises from collecting payments that are owed. The
constant management of cash flow creates an ongoing contingency, whereby a firm must make
decisions based on its customers’ ability and willingness to pay. Possessing the flexibility to
adjust terms of payment is then critical in such contingent situations (Peng & Luo, 2000). In a
similar financial context, research shows that having cash on hand can reduce dependence on
creditors who may or may not feel an obligation to firms seeking credit (Uzzi, 1999).
Firms can never truly prepare for all contingencies. However, possessing discretionary
financial resources creates a great deal of flexibility (George, 2005). One treatment of autonomy
is in the form of cash on hand or other financial flexibility that allows a firm to operate in the
manner it desires. Peng and Luo (2000) find that firms with favorable terms of payment
experience higher performance. The ability to collect accounts receivable, along with favorable
terms for accounts payable maximizes the amount of cash in the firms at all time, granting
greater flexibility. Peng and Luo (2000) find that such payment terms produce gains in market
share. Uzzi (1999) also suggests that a similar measure of autonomy produces benefits for the
firm. Firms with cash on hand sufficient to fund the operations of the firm in the short-term
experienced less dependence on creditors in the form of a lower cost of capital. As higher costs
of capital are expenses with no attached benefit, such expenses are likely to limit the firm’s
autonomy and reduce any expected growth (Peng & Luo, 2000).
In sum, financial autonomy stemming from discretionary resources provides flexibility
(Peng & Luo, 2000; George, 2005) that may grant multiple benefits. Financial autonomy assists
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firms working to meet the changing demands of the environment, (Beekun & Ginn, 1993;
Ingram & Simons, 1995), and reduces dependence on others (Uzzi, 1999). These benefits then
lead to the growth of the firm (Rosenbusch et al., 2013; Peng & Luo, 2000; Columbo & Grilli,
2010). Thus:

H4: Financial autonomy in the form of discretionary cash resources will mediate the
relationship between financial dependence remedies and sales growth.

Avoiding Opportunistic Behavior
The second mechanism of autonomy allows a firm to avoid opportunistic behavior on the
part of other parties (Oliver, 1991a). Opportunistic behavior may take place within an IOR by a
resource provider, leading benefits for the resource provider and negative outcomes for the focal
firm (Oliver, 1991a). However, some evidence also suggests that firms using their power to
control other firms in such IORs experience lower firm performance (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). In
this case controlling tactics may cause the less powerful firm to operate less efficiently and make
less of an effort. Instead of working together to produce a larger pie, the more powerful firm
simply gains a larger share of a smaller pie (Gulati & Sytch, 2007).
Firms seeking resources that require a great deal of commitment may be more likely to
encounter opportunistic behavior from an IOR partner. For example, manufacturing resources
are capital intensive, scarcely available, and may require equity transfers or other substantial
commitments (Katila et al., 2008). Such commitments may then prevent firms from seeking
alternative resources, causing autonomy to depend on the interactions taking place within the
IOR. Additionally, the relatively scarce nature of such resources may prevent firms from having
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alternative choices when choosing a resource provider. Firms being abused by such powerful
trading partners may seek to maneuver around those partners to reduce dependence (Ketchen &
Hult, 2007), but such maneuvers may be unavailable given the lack of alternatives and the high
levels of commitment required to secure the resource. Indeed, Gerwin (1993) finds that
manufacturing firms tend to seek long-term commitments from those seeking their services in
order to reduce the risk related to the failure of the manufactured product. Firms offering
valuable high commitment resources may also seek to avoid their IOR partners having other
partners that provide the same resource, as opportunistic behavior may be more likely (Nohria &
Garcia-Pont, 1991). For example, a pharmaceutical firm may avoid entering into an R&D
alliance with a firm that is already engaged in a similar alliance with their direct competitor.
Firms are also unlikely to terminate alliances that are considered strategically important
(Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). In addition to the formal commitment made by partners in a high
commitment alliance, large investments are unlikely to be abandoned quickly as firms make
escalations of commitment (Sleesman et al., 2012). For example, a firm launching a new product
is likely to begin by outsourcing some tasks, but then later enter into an alliance to secure
manufacturing (Marion et al., 2015). Overall, firms are likely to secure high commitment
resources from only one alliance partner and to be committed to that partner for some time.
High commitment resource dependence may continue throughout the life of an IOR as
well. Wasti and Liker (1999) explain how constraints in the manufacturing services available to a
firm effect the overall design of a product, suggesting that dependence on manufacturing
resources may also be present during and after product development. While firms may prefer
certain specifications for products, such preferences may not be commercially or technologically
realistic. Such issues may come to light after manufacturing alliances have been formed, leading
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to a suboptimal situation with few or no available alternatives (Wasti & Liker, 1999). Firms
attempting to maintain control over innovations may also be concerned when securing
manufacturing resources for products. Manufacturing is likely to be secured through a larger firm
with excess capacity (Pisano, 1990), and in such circumstances, a manufacturer’s interests may
not align with the interests of its customer. Rather than simply providing manufacturing, the
opportunity to misappropriate any valuable product design or innovation is a possibility (Santos
& Eisenhardt, 2005; Hallen et al., 2014). This possible opportunistic behavior only creates
additional dependence on the choice and acquisition of manufacturing resources by smaller
firms.
Firms with autonomy can avoid opportunistic behavior from IOR partners that grant
access to high commitment resources (Oliver, 1991a). One manner in which firms may do so is
to avoid entering into relationships that allow firms to engage in such behavior with little to no
consequences for doing so. Firms may succeed in this endeavor if they can enter into IORs to
secure resources with as little commitment as possible, as a lower commitment level suggests
that firms possess other options to secure the resource. Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) explain
that IORs such as distribution agreements or those that do not require equity to be transferred
represent lower levels of commitment than IORs such as independent joint ventures or
acquisitions. Additionally, accessing strategic resources via IORs is typically less costly than
internal development and creates an easier path to reverse course if necessary (Porter & Fuller,
1986). Within IORs, commitment level is higher when equity transfers are involved (Nohria &
Garica-Pont, 1991), which also works to prevent change once decisions are made to enter into
such an IOR.
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Firms prefer lower commitment IORs to higher commitment IORs, as IOR partners are
more likely to offer cooperation and assistance that allows the resource provided to be beneficial
(Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991). Similar relationships are found in the literature describing mutual
dependence and complementary resources. Mutually dependent firms are more likely to work
together toward common goals and is empirically shown to increase alliance performance (Xia,
2011; Xia & Li, 2013). Mutual dependence may also lead to the growth of the firm as it
emphasizes joint action and trust, which may drive the growth of the firm (Grewel, Iyer, Javalgi,
& Radulovich, 2011). Thus:

H5a: Complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship between high
commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and sales growth, such that
lower commitment levels will positively mediate the relationship between IORs and sales
growth.

Meeting Multiple Demands
Oliver (1991a) also describes autonomy as allowing a firm to meet the demands of
multiple external actors simultaneously, preventing resources from being constrained. Hambrick,
Finkelstein, Cho, and Jackson (2005) further theorize about dealing with multiple external actors
simultaneously. An increase in legitimate business models combined with less government
influence and more diverse managerial backgrounds helps create increased heterogeneity among
firms in an industry. Working together, these factors suggest that organizations have a wide
variety of dependence reduction remedies at their disposal, but also likely means that
organizations must be able to meet the differing demands created by a more heterogeneous
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external environment. The ability to meet multiple or differing demands simultaneously suggests
that an organization can successfully deal with multiple external actors at once, either by meeting
their demands, or choosing alternative options that produce more favorable outcomes for the
focal organization. Hambrick et al. (2005) also posit that environmental conditions are now more
favorable for firms seeking autonomy. Through a combination of reduced government oversight,
an increase in the diversity of the task-backgrounds of managers, and a rise in the number of
viable business models, firms possess a multitude of options for acquiring necessary resources
and reducing dependence. Forming relationships with new partners indeed provides additional
access to resources and thus possible solutions to problems. Firms facing environmental
uncertainty are more likely to undertake such action (Beckman et al., 2004).
Ahoni, Maimon, and Segev (1981) examine the effects of multiple competing demands.
Managers often face heterogeneous pressures, but some pressures are complementary. That is, by
satisfying one set of pressures managers can simultaneously reduce another set, suggesting that
multiple demands can be met simultaneously. David, Bloom, and Hillman (2007) also find
evidence to support this mechanism of autonomy. Firms seeking to satisfy activist investors and
shareholders are often able to appease both parties or overcome demands when in a position to
do so. Firms are found to either challenge investor petitions in court, ignore them and allow a
shareholder vote, or compromise with the activist in order to pacify the demand and
simultaneously continue to pursue the firm’s intended goals (David et al., 2007). Empirical
support also exists showing that firms can utilize or create additional options to secure external
resources. In their seminal study of the United Way, Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch (1980) show
how ties with third parties can affect the dyadic relationship between two organizations.
Resources are obtained not just through power and influence over one party, but through a
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network of relationships between organizations. Similarly, Gargiulo (1993) demonstrates that
autonomy can be created by creating a relationship with a third party in order to assert influence
over or alleviate pressure from another party. Seeking these new relationships can reduce
uncertainty by granting access to a wider range of resource providers (Beckman, Haunschild, &
Phillips, 2004), likely increasing autonomy.
New firms are also shown to benefit from access to a large and heterogeneous group of
resource providers, resulting in reduced dependence on any given partner. Firms may gain access
to novel solutions, overcome a lack of knowledge, and identify the best partners available as the
business continues to develop (Sullivan & Ford, 2014). New firms with multiple alliances are
shown to see an increase in sales growth, and a diverse set of alliances leads to both sales growth
and increases in market share (Pangarka & Wu, 2013).
Overall, firms seeking low commitment complementary resources are likely to gain
autonomy when access to multiple resource providers is present. In such instances, a lower
commitment level should be required to access such resources, as low commitment resources are
more readily available. Successfully doing so will then lead to an increase in firm performance
(Drees & Heugens, 2013).

H5b: Complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship between low
commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and sales growth, such that
lower commitment levels will positively mediate the relationship between IORs and sales
growth.
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Preventing New Dependencies
Pfeffer (1987) notes that attempts to remedy resource dependence are not likely to be
completely successful and that any action taken is likely to produce a new and different set of
dependencies than previously existed. This is further supported by the narrative review work of
Hillman et al. (2009), who find that attempts to restore autonomy are not often fully successful,
and often cause new sets of dependencies to emerge. This assumption fits within the logic of
resource dependence theory. A focal firm seeking resources from another firm is unlikely to gain
access to those resources without giving up something of value in exchange. The exchange
partner is also influenced by its external environment and acts with self-interest (Pfeffer, 1972b),
making it unlikely to give up its own autonomy without benefit. Pfeffer (1981) also assumes that
organizations work to secure resources that cause other organizations to become dependent on
them. However, some evidence suggests that using such power may result in poor performance
for the firm as less powerful firms have no incentive to improve performance when benefits will
simply accrue to more powerful firms (Gulati & Sytch, 2007).
In contrast, IORs involving a degree of cooperation, or that provide complementary
benefits in addition to the resources being exchanged may create a set of conditions that lead to
mutual benefit for both organizations. Madhok and Tallman (1998) find that alliance value is
embedded within inter- and intrafirm relationships, which drive the collection of rents and
provide an incentive to maintain the relationship. The formation of such relationships may also
prevent the creation of new dependencies as firms instead work toward mutual goals and
benefits.
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Boards of Directors and Financial Autonomy
Daily and Schwenk (1996) explain that resource dependence requirements influence the
composition of the board of directors, as firms use outside directors to establish relationships
with other organizations in the external environment. One such relationship that may induce the
cooperation needed to achieve mutual goals exists within the board of directors of venture
capital-backed firms. In such instances venture capital firms appoint members to the board of
directors as part of a funding agreement (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004), and those members are
likely to provide advice, counsel, and information (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) with the intent of
achieving firm growth (Zacharakis et al., 2007). This suggests that the board capital of venture
capital-appointed directors, represented as the sum of human and social capital (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003) may help prevent new dependencies from forming. From a resource dependence
perspective, board capital is proposed to lead to resource provision. Board members’ human
capital is proposed to provide advice and counsel regarding the strategy and direction of the firm,
while social capital provides access to various types of information.
The human and social capital of board members that makes up board capital are studied
throughout the literature. Hillman et al. (2009) suggest that the types of human and social capital
present within the board of directors should be parsed to understand precisely what types are
needed to provide the benefits listed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Indeed, different types of
human capital provide access to different types of resource provision. Hillman, Cannella, and
Paetzold (2000) propose a taxonomy of directors using a resource dependence lens, categorizing
them according to the resources provided by their expertise. Business experts possess expertise
on competition, assist in decision making, and offer alternative viewpoints on problems facing
the firm. They are likely to be current and former executives or directors at other large firms.
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Support specialists provide specialized expertise in areas such as law and banking. They could
also provide access to critical resources (e.g., financial, legal), and bring social capital that
provided communication with powerful external organizations or the government. Support
specialists are likely to be lawyers, bankers, or PR experts. Finally, influential community
members provide perspectives on and represent interests outside of the profit-seeking goals of
the organization. They can influence powerful groups in the community, and may be political
leaders, university faculty, or leaders of community organizations. (Hillman et al., 2000).
Overall, directors may bring different types of expertise to the firm that provide benefits in
specific ways, and the overall relationship between resource provision and performance has
empirical support throughout the literature as well.
Within the context of entrepreneurship, Unger et al. (2011) also demonstrate that
different types of human capital lead to performance. Human capital outcomes, such as
knowledge and skills, are more beneficial than human capital investments such as education.
Human capital related to entrepreneurial tasks also has a stronger relationship with performance
than human capital related to non-entrepreneurial tasks. While this study focuses on the human
capital of the entrepreneur rather than the board of directors (Unger et al., 2011), the
entrepreneurial context seems likely to match well to the resource provision that directors engage
in, especially directors of smaller, private firms who may have valuable entrepreneurial
experience.
Empirical evidence demonstrating the relationship between board capital and
performance exists in several contexts. In one study that examines differences in board capital,
Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008) investigate the human and social capital of
former government officials as it applies to resource provision. Findings suggest that the tenure
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and position of the official influences the likelihood of being appointed to a board of directors.
Additionally, utilizing the taxonomy of Hillman et al. (2000), Kroll, Walters, and Le (2007)
show that post-IPO firms are likely to benefit from certain types of directors. After delineating
business experts into those that provided advice and counsel and those that provided monitoring,
results show that business expert directors providing advice and counsel lead to higher market
returns (Kroll et al., 2007).
While boards are shown to assist in performance in many circumstances (e.g., Dalton et
al., 1999; Lynall et al., 2003), small firms are often faced with decisions regarding dependencies
and ownership control, which may threaten autonomy. Indeed, entrepreneurs are often faced with
decisions to accept critical financial resources from providers that may usurp their own valuable
resources (Hallen, Katila, & Rosenberger, 2014; Katila et al., 2008). Additionally, some research
finds that owners seek to protect their control of the firm. Daily and Dalton (1993) show that
founder-led firms have smaller boards and fewer independent directors, as founders seek to
maintain control of their firms. Fiegener et al. (2000) further demonstrate that owner-led firms
are likely to appoint board members dependent on the owner, insulating the owner’s control of
the firm, while non-majority owners are more likely to appoint independent directors to help
with resource provision. However, a founder’s decision to insulate himself or herself can be
detrimental as smaller, less independent boards are associated with lower firm performance
(Daily & Dalton, 1993). Indeed, as entrepreneurs are required to provide board seats (Kaplan &
Stromberg, 2004) in exchange for financial resources, choosing not to do so in order to insulate
control may prevent firms from experiencing the benefits that accrue from venture capital (e.g.,
Baum & Silverman, 2004). Evidence suggests that some entrepreneurs do work to appoint board
members that may bring benefits to the firm.
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Clarysse, Knockaert, and Lockett (2007) examine board composition in start-up firms in
terms of the human capital present on the board. Differences in external equity holders are found
to lead to different types of human capital on the board. More specifically, public research
organizations with equity stakes are more likely to add complementary human capital, while
venture capitalists with equity stakes and autonomous owners are likely to add substitute human
capital to the board. However, Kor and Misangyi (2008) also investigate boards of
entrepreneurial firms and find differing results. Boards are used for access to industry-related
experience when top management teams are lacking in industry experience, suggesting that
boards may be used to access complementary human capital. Regardless of type, this research
suggests that boards are utilized to add human capital to the firm.
In sum, the composition of a board for entrepreneurial firms presents several dilemmas
for founders. Entrepreneurs may face threats from some resource providers attempting to procure
the firm’s valuable business assets (Katila et al., 2008), and owners may appoint dependent
board members in order to protect the owner’s control of the firm (Fiegener et al., 2000). Despite
these potential pitfalls, many boards of entrepreneurial firms are not entirely composed of
insiders. Boards of venture-backed firms typically have one or more members appointed by the
venture capitalist, as entrepreneurs are required to provide board seats in exchange for financial
resources (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). Board members appointed in this way and possessing
valuable human and social capital are more likely to bring benefits to the firm (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003), rather than constraints. Indeed, human capital in entrepreneurial settings has a
positive relationship with firm performance (Unger et al., 2011). Overall, resource provision by
the board of directors is shown to have a positive relationship with firm performance (Westphal,
1999; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Thus:
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H6: Board capital in outside board members will moderate the relationship between
financial autonomy and sales growth, such that higher levels of board capital will lead to
greater sales growth.

Complementary Human Capital and Autonomy
Firms engaged in IORs face the possibility of opportunistic behavior from their
relationship partner (Teece, 1986), but may also receive positive benefits due to trust and joint
action or actively working together (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Firms seeking to avoid the creation
of new sets of dependencies that may exist after the remedy of one dependency (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978) may do so when IOR partners bring synergistic or complementary attributes to
the table, creating the best incentive to work together for mutual benefit. Evidence suggests that
firms do seek this mutual benefit.
Firms with complementary resources and partner-specific knowledge are shown to enter
into alliances (Wang & Zajac, 2007), suggesting that firms are seeking synergy or other positive
outcomes that may prevent new dependencies from forming. That is, the existence of
complementary resources suggests that each firm possesses a resource that its partner requires
but does not have, and also receives added benefit from working together and sharing such
resources. Firms in such relationships are likely to retain autonomy, as each firm benefits from
freely providing its resource (Das & Teng, 2000), and abstaining from any coercion or use of
power that creates a disincentive for the partner firm (Gulati & Sytch, 2007).
While many resources can be complementary, human capital is perhaps the most valuable
resource a firm possesses, and its inimitable nature suggests that it is difficult to acquire (Coff,
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1997; 1999; Crook et al., 2011). Accessing complementary human capital resources may thus be
better accomplished by engaging in alliances as opposed to acquisitions (Wang & Zajac, 2007)
or intra-industry recruitment (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). While alliance outcomes are largely positive
when post-alliance actions such as learning by doing or joint action (Gulati & Sytch, 2007) are
present, firms seeking to avoid the exchange of one dependency for another (Pfeffer, 1987) must
know prior to alliance formation if synergistic opportunities exist. Thus, the existence of
complementary human capital provides firms with the knowledge that such opportunities are
likely to exist. While the mere existence of complementary human capital does not guarantee
access to or benefits from an IOR, a known lack of complementary human capital does guarantee
that benefits will not accrue. Firms entering into IORs with complementary human capital are
then more likely to obtain synergistic benefits from doing so (Harrison et al., 2001), and to
improve performance (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). Such IORs are likely to be long-lasting due to low
coordination costs and increased efficiencies (Humphreys, Lei, and Chan 2004), suggesting that
firms maintain their own decision-making ability and autonomy. Long-lasting alliances built on
successful IORs are also shown to lead to traditional financial measures of firm performance
(Adams, Khoja, & Kauffman, 2012). Thus:

H7a (7b): Complementary human capital between the alliance partner and management
team of the focal firm will moderate the relationship between high (low) commitment
complementary resource autonomy and sales growth, such that higher levels of
complementary human capital will lead to greater sales growth.
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CHAPTER IV: METHODS
Data and Methods
Sample
To test the above hypotheses data will be collected form a sample of private firms that
publicly announce agreements to secure financial and complementary resources. Data is
collected from 2008-2017, avoiding the biggest disruptions of the financial crisis while still
allowing for a longitudinal approach in analysis. In order to appropriately capture the
entrepreneurial context described earlier in this paper, data will be gathered from firms six years
old or less (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000).
Data is collected from multiple sources. First, firm-specific data are provided by PrivCo.
PrivCo is a database of private company financial information containing financial performance
data, venture capital transactions, and executive and investor profiles. PrivCo sources
information from regulatory filings, news sources, and industry resources. Data is available on
over 850,000 private companies and 112,000 private market deals (PrivCo, 2016). A total of
3,783 firm-years containing at least some of the required data were found. A total of 3,058 firmyears are found with observations for company revenue, leading to a total of 2,140 observations
for the dependent variable, sales growth. After other missing data was removed from the
analysis, a total of 921 firm-years offered complete data for analysis.
Second, IORs are collected from company websites, PrivCo, and the Factiva database.
Company names as well as keywords such as alliance, joint venture, acquisition, and partner
were used in the search. Third, additional information regarding firm executive profiles, board
member profiles and investor profiles are collected from multiple sources where necessary.
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These sources include, LinkedIn, Relationship Science, and company websites. LinkedIn is used
to capture data related to human capital and board capital. Relationship Science (relsci.com) is
used to identify board members and board interlocks. Relationship Science provides information
on corporate executives and board members, including work history and personal networks, for
thousands of public and private firms. The service is designed to identify relationships between
individuals, making it appropriate for identifying specific firms’ members and their relationships.

Dependent Variable
Sales growth. Based on previously reviewed literature, financial and complementary
remedies are most likely to be successful when firms seek growth as an outcome (Rosenbusch et
al., 2013). Sales growth will be measured as the percent change in year-over-year sales
(Columbo & Grilli, 2010) using the following equation:

Independent Variables

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ =

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1

Firms are shown to engage in IORs when facing resource dependence situations
(Finkelstein, 1997). As such, a firm-level view of all such remedies best captures the actions of a
firm seeking to remedy resource dependence. A total count of IORs in each year that seek to
remedy dependence will be created. IORs will be separately examined according to the nature of
the dependence a firm is attempting to remedy using the following constructs.
Financial resource dependence remedy. Financial remedies will be measured by an
agreement to secure funding between a focal firm and an individual angel investor, venture
capitalist firm, or private equity firm. Firms are incentivized to seek funding that is appropriate
for their needs, as seeking too little funding will fail to produce needed benefits, and too much
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funding can cause the firm to exchange more equity than necessary for such funding (Katila et
al., 2008). As firms may have more than one financial remedy, the total of all such agreements in
each year will be counted.
High and low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies.
Complementary resource dependence remedies will be measured by an agreement to secure a
complementary resource (e.g., manufacturing, marketing, R&D). Katila et al. (2008) find that
firms enter into IORs to remedy complementary dependencies differently based on scarcity. In
order to capture high and low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies, the
type of alliance activity will be examined. Following the findings and explanation by Katila et al.
(2008), agreements considered to grant access to high commitment resources include: exclusive
licensing agreements, exploration agreements, manufacturing agreements, and R&D agreements.
Agreements considered to grant access to low commitment include: non-exclusive licensing
agreements, marketing agreements, and supply agreements. A count of each type of remedy
within each year will be taken. Other types of agreements are coded high or low based on their
similarity to these specifically named types.
IOR data is collected from company websites. Many firms publicly announce IOR
activity, including the activity that partners will engage in as well as the structure of the IOR. For
example, a firm may announce that they have created an independent joint venture to conduct
R&D. Firm IOR activity is also double-checked using Factiva.
Mediating Variables
Financial autonomy. Financial autonomy is measured as the log of total revenue divided
by venture capital funding. Large amounts of cash provide firms with the best opportunity to
retain autonomy when facing contingencies (Oliver, 1991a; Peng& Luo, 2000). Entrepreneurial
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firms typically have two options for access to cash. They can produce their own via revenue, or
they can secure venture capital funding. Firms earning enough revenue to operate and grow are
unlikely to seek venture capital, as doing so requires a costly grant of equity (Rosenstein, 1988)
as well as influence that is attached to the equity. However, outside funding is often required to
grow the firm. Entrepreneurs are thus incentivized to accept an appropriate amount of venture
capital. That is, enough capital to meet the strategic needs of firm, but not an access amount that
comes with high costs (Wang & Zhou, 2004). Firms accepting venture capital are dependent on
that capital to the extent that they are able to operate without it. Thus, the ratio of revenue to
funding represents how well a firm is capable of meeting its financial requirements without
outside capital.
Complementary resource autonomy. Complementary resource autonomy measures the
level of control over resources that firms have when securing such resources through IORs. In
order to capture complementary resource autonomy for both high and low commitment resources
as described above, multiple steps will be taken. First, alliances will be coded using the alliance
intensity scale developed by Contractor and Lorange (1988) and Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991).
The scale rates alliances from 1-9 based on the level of commitment required between alliance
partners as follows: 1. Distribution agreements. 2. Know-how and patent-licensing agreements.
3. Component sourcing agreements. 4. Second source agreements. 5. Broad R&D Agreements. 6.
Minority Equity. 7. Limited Cross Equity Ownership. 8. Independent Joint Ventures. 9. Mergers
and acquisitions. Relative to lower ratings on the scale, higher ratings represent longer-term and
more permanent solutions for access to resources. Firms with higher ratings on the alliance
intensity scale should, all else equal, have higher autonomy due to having stronger control over
the resource accessed in the alliance. Other factors may clearly influence control over resources
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beyond the commitment-level of the alliance. Such factors are discussed and measured as control
variables below.
To code alliances I will first coded 100 alliances from the sample. Second, a second
coder coded the same alliances. Coding matched on 82 of 100 alliances. Discrepancies were
discussed until coding agreements were made. Third, I coded all alliances used in the sample
based on the coding scheme. Lastly, an equation is developed based on the alliance intensity
scale and the alliance concentration measure developed by Ahuja (2000). Whereas Ahuja (2000)
calculates the level of concentration based on specific alliance partners, complementary resource
autonomy intends to capture the overall commitment of a firm based on alliance intensity across
alliance partners. The following equation will be calculated:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4
+ 9 + 9 + 9 + ⋯ 9𝑛𝑛
9
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = �
𝑛𝑛

Where AI represents the coded value of alliance intensity and n represents the total
number of alliances.
Moderating Variables
Board capital. Members of boards of directors are identified through PrivCo, company
websites, and Relationship Science. Board members LinkedIn profiles are used to gather
information about their occupational characteristics. Occupations are then coded according to the
typology put forth by (Hillman et al., 2000). Board interlocks are counted using Relationship
Science, which provides a thorough list of director positions held. Board capital is a multidimensional measure of the human and social capital of firm directors (Hillman & Dalziel,
2003). As firms are often required to appoint board members as part of an agreement to secure
venture capital (Park & Steensma, 2014), the board capital of these members will be examined.
More specifically, the social capital aspect of board capital is measured as a count of director
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interlocks (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011). The human capital aspect of board capital is
measured using a heterogeneity index (Blau, 1977) of the board’s occupational characteristics
(Hillman et al., 2000). Occupational background categories include: “…general management,
finance/accounting, sales/marketing, legal, information systems, operations, engineering, human
resources, military/government, and real estate” (Haynes & Hillman, 2010 p. 1154). This is
calculated using the following equation:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑐𝑐 = 1 −

∑(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )2

∑�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 �

2

Where xi represents number of individuals with each occupational background and xj represents
the total of all occupational backgrounds present on the board (Blau, 1977).
Complementary human capital. Firm TMTs are first identified through multiple
sources, including PrivCo, company websites, and LinkedIn. Human capital data from firm
TMTs was collected from LinkedIn. The previous firms of the TMT as well as whether a TMT
member previously founded a firm was captured. NAIC codes for each firm were then sourced
from Mergent Online and Manta.com. Mergent and Manta were also used to locate NAIC codes
for firm alliance partners.
Drawing on the measure of complementary resources used by Lin, Yang, and Arya
(2009), complementary human capital will be measured using the industry-specific human
capital of the focal firm management team and the industry in which the alliance partner resides.
The following equation will be calculated:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − ∑𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

Where TMTHCi represents the two-digit NAIC code of each industry in which a top
management team member has experience, APi represents the two-digit NAIC codes of alliance
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partners, and Mi represents a two-digit NAIC codes present for both the top management team
and alliance partner. Each of these terms is represented as a count. For example, if a management
team has experience in industries with four different NAIC codes, an alliance partner has one
NAIC code, and it matches the NAIC code of the alliance partner, the calculation is: (4 + 1 – 1)/5
= 0.8. Thus, higher numbers represent a higher level of complementary human capital.
Additionally, firms may have more than one NAIC code (Wang & Zajac, 2007), which
theoretically allows for the calculation to be negative. In such instances, it will be assumed that
no complementary human capital is present and the variable will be set to zero (Lin et al., 2009).

Control Variables
Industry. Industry will be controlled for using a dummy variable for each two-digit
NAIC code (Robb & Seamans, 2014).
Size. Firm size will be measured as the total employees of the firm (Lu & Beamish,
2006).
Age. Firm age will be measured as the number of years since the founding of the firm
(Fink & Harris, 2012).
Year. The calendar year will be included to control for year-to-year differences
(Beckman et al., 2004).
Board size. The total number of members on the board of directors (Beckman et al.,
2004).
Entrepreneurial human capital. Entrepreneurial human capital will be captured using
two measures. First, the number of years of industry experience of the founder(s) will be
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gathered. Second, the number of previous start-ups by the founder(s) will be counted (Unger et
al., 2011).
Top management team size. A count of the management team size will be gathered
(Baum & Silverman, 2004).
Total number of alliances. A total count of current firm alliances will be gathered
(Ozmel et al., 2013).
Venture capital reputation. Prior research shows that the VC firms possessing strong
reputations select investment targets with higher potential (Sorensen, 2007). To control for these
possible effects VC reputation is controlled for. As IPOs are typically the most successful
venture exit for VC firms, the cumulative market capitalization of IPOs backed by the VC is
used to capture reputation (Nahata, 2008). Following Nahata (2008), these measures will be
collected over a 10-year period from 2006-2015. Thus, firms in my sample that were founded in
2010 have at least four years of IPO data from which to draw reputation measures, and firms
founded in 2015 have ten years. Venture capital reputation is captured using the VentureXpert
database within SDC Platinum. All publicly traded firms that completed an IPO between the
years 2005 and 2015 are identified, as well as all investors in the firm, and the market
capitalization at the end of the first day of trading. The overall market share capitalization of
IPOs is then calculated for each investor (Nahata, 2008)
Board monitoring and opportunism. Unlike public firm that have requirements to
appoint independent directors, private firms do not face the same obligations. Instead, founders
and VC investors are expected to carry out monitoring of the firm through the board of directors
(Garg, 2013). However, VCs and funded firms may have differing goals, causing owners to
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monitor in ways that VCs may not. Thus, board monitoring is thus measured as the ratio of firm
insiders to board outsiders. To prevent division by zero, 1 is added to the denominator.
To capture the possibility of opportunistic behavior by firm outsiders, a count of the total
outsiders is used. Outsider board members are typically appointed by the VC firm (Kaplan &
Stromberg, 2004). Having more board members gives the VC firm leverage to pursue an exit or
an early push to profitability when doing so may not be wise (Cumming, 2008). As VCs must
often return capital to their limited partners, pressures to act opportunistically exist, and firms
with higher representations of outsiders are thus more likely to face opportunism.
Analysis
Data will be collected that represents different periods of time. This creates nonindependent nested data that requires a mixed-effects model. Mixed-effects models allow for
analysis of fixed-effects that include all variables regardless of time as well as random-effects
that include all variables that differ across time in order to capture variables that apply to all
observations as well as those that change depending on time or other changing effects. To
perform such analysis the xtmixed command in stata is utilized. This command allows for
analysis over time as well as multilevel analysis, which in this case involves grouping at the
industry-level.
Examination of the data shows that the dependent variable, firm performance measured
as revenue growth, has several substantial outliers that are likely to skew results. This is not
surprising given the nature of the firms in the sample, as young firms are more likely to grow at a
faster rate (Markman & Gartner, 2002). As firms move from very little revenue to substantial
revenue in a short period of time firms may occasionally experience revenue growth figures in
the thousands of percent. Indeed, 24 observations in the data show firms with over 20,000%
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growth. As such large numbers can substantially effect results, observations greater than two
standard deviations above the mean were trimmed from the analysis. This resulted in 28
observations being trimmed. Additionally, robust standard errors are used in the analysis to avoid
issues related to heteroskedasticity.
Hypotheses 1-3 test the direct effect of each type of resource dependence remedy on firm
performance. Hypotheses 6, 7a, and 7b examine moderation effects. These hypotheses are tested
using the xtmixed command as described above. Hypotheses 4, 5a, and 5b test mediation.
Analysis is performed using the sgmediation command in Stata, which performs Sobel-Goodman
mediation tests. Sobel-Goodman tests can determine the amount, if any, of influence that a
mediating variable carries from an independent variable to a dependent variable. This test is
necessary to test mediation, as xtmixed can only examine the relationship between independent
variables and moderators and a dependent variable. Results can indicate the proportion of the
total effect that is mediated as well as the significance of each path in the mediation.
Model fit is assessed using Akaike information criterion (AIC).
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS
Correlations are presented in table 5.1. Board size and board opportunism are found to be
highly correlated (0.91). To check for multicollinearity a Tolerance level and VIF are calculated.
The Tolerance level is found to be .997 and the VIF is found to be 1.0. These results fall
substantially below suggested levels of Tolerance greater than 0.2 and VIF less than 10.0 (Hair et
al., 2010). = 1.00. No other variables are found to be highly correlated such that
multicollinearity may be an issue.
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 5.2. Firm performance, measured as revenue
growth, is present for 2,140 observations out of a possible 3,783. Given that at least two years of
revenue must be available to calculate growth, this is a reasonable ratio of available observations.
All other variables have at least as many observations. However, as missing data throughout the
sample appears to be random, the number of complete observations available for testing is
reduced to 921. Descriptive statistics also show that the mean of firm performance is equal to
2.09, but the standard deviation is 7.41, with a maximum value of 200.1. As firm performance is
measured as a percentage, this means that one firm grew revenue by just over 20,000% percent
in one year. Growth rates of this magnitude are more than likely due to the timing of when a firm
begins to earn revenue in a calendar year, or a complete change in the attempt to earn revenue at
all, rather than the outcome of a strategic decision. As such, observations of firm performance
greater than two standard deviations above the mean are excluded from analysis as described
above.
Hypotheses 1-3 test the direct effect of financial dependence remedies, high commitment
complementary remedies and low commitment complementary remedies on firm performance.
Multiple control variables are also used in the analysis, including board size, board opportunism,
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board monitoring, entrepreneurial human capital, firm age, firm size, TMT size, and VC
reputation. Results of H1-H3, as well as the control model, are shown in Table 5.3. Hypothesis 1
states that financial resource dependence remedies will have a positive relationship with firm
performance. Results show a positive and significant relationship (Ɓ = 0.458, p < .01), thus
supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 states that high commitment complementary resource
dependence remedies will have a positive relationship with firm performance. Results fail to find
support for Hypothesis 2 (Ɓ = 0.185, p = .18). Hypothesis 3 states that low commitment
complementary resource dependence remedies will have a positive relationship with firm
performance. Results show a significant but negative effect (Ɓ = -0.099, p < .01), thus failing to
find support for Hypothesis 3.
Hypotheses 4, 5a, and 5b all test mediation between each of previously tested resource
dependence remedies and firm performance. Mediation is tested using Sobel-Goodman
mediation. Results of each mediation are shown in Table 5.4. Hypothesis 4 states that financial
autonomy will mediate the relationship between financial resource dependence remedies and
firm performance. While financial dependence remedies are shown to have a positive and
significant relationship with firm performance (Ɓ = 0.572, p <.01) and financial autonomy (Ɓ = 10.507, p <.01), no relationship was found between financial autonomy and firm performance (Ɓ
= -0.014, p = .41). Further, none of the Sobel-Goodman Mediation tests are significant. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
Hypothesis 5a states that complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship
between high commitment resource dependence remedies and firm performance. Results show
that high commitment remedies have a negative and significant effect on firm performance (Ɓ =
-0.398, p < .05) and that complementary autonomy has a positive and significant (Ɓ = 4.77, p
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<.01) effect on firm performance. Sobel-Goodman tests are also significant (Ɓ = 0.58, p <.01).
These results show that mediation is present, however, the negative coefficient of high
commitment complementary autonomy is counter to the hypothesized relationship. Thus,
Hypothesis 5a is not supported.
Hypothesis 5b states that complementary resource autonomy will mediate the relationship
between low commitment resource dependence remedies and firm performance. Results show
that low commitment remedies have a positive and significant relationship with low commitment
complementary autonomy (Ɓ = 0.04, p <.01), but no relationship is found between low
commitment remedies and firm performance (Ɓ = -0.029, p = .87) or between low commitment
complementary autonomy and firm performance (Ɓ = -0.7, p = .44). Sobel-Goodman mediation
tests are also non-significant. Thus, Hypothesis 5b is not supported.
Hypotheses 6, 7a, and 7b test moderation between each of the mediators and firm
performance. Results are shown in Table 5.7. Hypothesis 6 states that board capital will
moderate the relationship between financial autonomy and firm performance, such that higher
levels of board capital will lead to higher levels of firm performance. Board capital is comprised
of the human and social capital of board members (Hillman et al., 2009), so each aspect of tested
separately. Board (human) capital is shown to have a negative and significant direct relationship
with firm performance (Ɓ = -0.95, p < .01). As lower values in the measure of board capital
represent higher amounts of board capital, this result is expected. However, the moderating effect
of board (human) capital on firm performance is non-significant (Ɓ = 0.03, p =.22). Board
(social) capital is also proposed to moderate the relationship between financial autonomy and
firm performance. No result is found (Ɓ = -0.0001, p = .85). As neither component of board
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capital is found to moderate the relationship between financial autonomy and firm performance,
Hypothesis 6 is not supported.
Hypothesis 7a examines the moderation of complementary human capital on the
relationship between high commitment complementary autonomy and firm performance. Results
show a negative but not significant relationship between the interaction term and firm
performance (Ɓ = -6.51, p = .07). Hypothesis 7b examines the moderation between low
commitment complementary autonomy and firm performance. A significant relationship is not
found (Ɓ = 2.29, p = .39). Thus, Hypothesis 7b is not supported.
Table 5.3 also present the full model with all direct effects and moderators. Interestingly,
Hypothesis 7a finds support in this model (Ɓ = -7.093, p < .05). This and other hypotheses are
further explored with post-hoc analysis.
Post-Hoc Analysis
Sobel-Goodman mediation tests are only capable of examining one mediating
relationship of interest at a time. To further explore the mediating relationships proposed
structural equation modeling (SEM) is used. SEM allows for full and simultaneous estimation of
the mediation and moderation effects, as compared to the combination of xtmixed and
sgmediation commands described above. Results are similar to the Sobel-Goodman mediation
test for Hypotheses 4 and 5a. However, differences arise when testing Hypothesis 5b. Hypothesis
5b states that complementary autonomy will mediate the relationship between low commitment
remedies and firm performance. This hypothesis is not supported using the Sobel-Goodman
method. However, structural equation modeling finds a significant relationship between low
commitment remedies and complementary autonomy (Ɓ = .08, p <.01), as well as between low
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commitment complementary autonomy and firm performance (Ɓ = -2.71, p <.05). As lower
commitment levels are represented by lower numbers, this lends support to Hypothesis 5b.
Hypothesis 7a examines the moderating effect of complementary human capital on the
relationship between complementary autonomy and firm performance. While regression analysis
did not find support, the p-value of .07 suggests a relationship may be present. Indeed, SEM
finds a significant effect (Ɓ = -7.15, p <.05). As lower levels signify less commitment and less
commitment is proposed to increase firm performance, this lends support to Hypothesis 7a. The
result is graphed in Figure 5.1.
Given non-significant and counter-findings to many of the hypotheses relating to
complementary resource dependence remedies, further post-hoc analysis is conducted. Research
shows that venture-backed firms tend to enter more alliances than non-venture-backed firms, and
but that alliance formation can be a substitute for venture capital (Wang et al., 2012). Thus,
entering into venture capital funding agreements should have a positive relationship with future
alliance formation, and alliance formation should have a negative relationship with future
venture capital funding. These relationships are tested using negative binomial regression, which
is appropriate for dependent variables made up of counts. Results are shown in Table 5.5. While
results do find a positive and significant relationship between venture capital funding and future
IORs (Ɓ = .15, p < 0.01), a positive and significant relationship is also found between IORs and
future venture capital funding (Ɓ = .032, p < .01). The latter result runs counter to the anticipated
finding that IORs would reduce the need for future venture capital and thus have a negative
relationship with future funding.
It should be noted that Wang et al. (2012) use a sample dating from 1992 to 2004, well
before the beginning of the sample used in this dissertation. Additionally, only venture-backed
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companies were used by Wang et al. (2012), whereas this sample utilizes both venture-back and
non-venture backed firms. Given the differences in both sample characteristics and empirical
findings, further research in this area is warranted. Possible avenues for such research are
discussed in the next chapter.

90

CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION

This dissertation broadly seeks to contribute to literature in resource dependence and firm
performance. More specifically, the nature of autonomy is examined in terms of the relationship
between resource dependence remedies and firm growth. Additionally, the human and board
capital of the TMT and venture board is examined in terms of how it may contribute to growth
with IORs. Each of these contributions is described below in greater detail.
Specific Findings
Hypothesis 1 proposes that financial resource dependence remedies, in the form of
venture capital, will lead to sales growth. Similar findings hold in numerous studies (e.g.,
Rosenbusch et al., 2013). This result thus further solidifies the relationship and provides a
starting point for mediating and moderating hypotheses. Hypotheses 2 and 3 examine the
relationship between high and low commitment complementary remedies, in the form of IORs,
and sales growth. Previous research examines the relationship between IORs and performance
(e.g., Lunnan & Haugland, 2008), typically finding positive outcomes stemming from IOR
formation. However, few studies consider the commitment level of the IOR in addition to the
type of resource gained (e.g., Katila et al., 2008). Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship
between high commitment complementary dependence remedies and sales growth, but is not
supported. Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive relationship between low commitment
complementary dependence remedies, but instead finds a significant negative relationship. A
negative relationship is somewhat surprising. It is certainly possible that such IORs may not lead
to increased sales growth, but it seems counter-intuitive for an IOR to prevent a firm from
growing. For such a relationship to hold beyond this sample it would seem that forming such
IORs would have to be a poor strategic choice that is unrealized by firm owners and managers,
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or that the goal of such IORs is something considered to be more important than growth. A more
likely explanation may be the nature of the resource sought. As these are low commitment
resources, some firms may be able to easily develop such resources internally at a relatively low
cost. Firms that must seek these resources externally may be expending additional resources to
do so, causing lower levels of growth.
Hypotheses 4, 5a, and 5b test the mediation of types of autonomy between their
respective resource dependence remedies and growth. Hypothesis 4 examines the relationship
between financial autonomy and growth. Unfortunately, no result was found. As firms must
eventually stand on their own via the creation of revenue or additional access to capital through
an IPO, it seems unlikely that a mediating, or perhaps moderating, effect is not present in the
relationship, despite this non-finding. The measurement of financial autonomy may be
preventing an effect from being found. This possibility is further discussed in the limitations
section.
Hypothesis 5a tests the relationship between high commitment resource dependence
remedies and high commitment complementary autonomy. While a significant result is found in
post-hoc analysis, the coefficient is opposite of the predicted direction. Lower levels of
commitment, represented by lower values in the complementary autonomy variable, would
produce a negative coefficient if the hypothesis was supported. The positive coefficient instead
means that within high commitment complementary remedies, higher commitment levels lead to
firm growth. One possible explanation is that the highest level of commitment, an acquisition,
may also bring added revenue to the firm. While any type of growth clearly shows up the same
in measures of revenue, other measures of efficiency or profitability may suffer, causing medium
and long-term issues for the firm. Further, as high commitment resources are by definition more
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difficult to obtain, having a higher commitment level may reduce uncertainty in the firm,
allowing for strategic decisions that better promote growth. High commitment levels may also
simply give permanent access to a needed resource, compared to the possible temporary access
of a lower commitment level.
Hypothesis 5b tests the relationship between low commitment resource dependence
remedies and low commitment complementary autonomy. Sobel-Goodman mediation tests fail
to find a significant result. However, SEM finds that low commitment complementary autonomy
negatively mediates the relationship between low commitment remedies and sales growth. This
is an interesting finding compared to the Sobel-Goodman result and the finding of H3, which
identifies a negative relationship between low commitment remedies and sales growth. SEM
instead identified no direct relationship between low commitment remedies and sales growth, but
instead a positive relationship between low commitment remedies and low commitment
complementary autonomy, followed by a negative relationship between such autonomy and sales
growth. This result supports H5b, as lower commitment levels lead to higher growth. This is the
logical result, as firms seeking low commitment resources externally should not have to make a
large commitment to secure such resources. Firms able to do this are likely acquiring resources
needed for further commercial development of their product or service (Teece, 1986) at a low
cost, whereas firm that must make a large commitment then suffer lower performance.
Hypotheses 6, 7a, and 7b examine moderation between each of the mediating variables
and growth. Board capital is examined separately in terms of the human and social capital of the
board. No result is found for either measure. As with financial autonomy itself, the issue may be
due to the measurement of the mediating variable. Hypothesis 7a tests complementary human
capital as a moderator between high commitment complementary autonomy and sales growth.
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Results show that higher levels of complementary human capital increase sales growth. While
the result of Hypothesis 5a is counter to the expected result, results of this moderation appear to
give further credence to the explanation that higher levels of commitment are preferred when
dealing with high commitment resources. As both parties are firmly committed, the presence of
complementary human capital creates additional benefits that are more likely to be leveraged
than if commitment levels were lower.
Hypothesis 7b tests complementary human capital as a moderator between low
commitment complementary autonomy and sales growth. No effect is found. While
complementary human capital is shown to be useful in high commitment contexts, it does not
appear to be effective in these situations. The result of Hypothesis 5b from the SEM analysis
may shed light on this non-finding. If firms are indeed securing resources with low levels of
commitment and experiencing sales growth from doing so, they effect of complementary human
capital in such situations may be irrelevant. Firms may be securing a resource in a straightforward and agreed-upon manner, and then continuing with their strategic plan without the need
to work together with the IOR partner for additional success.
Post-hoc analysis also finds an interesting relationship between IORs and funding. Firms
with more funding rounds are more likely to engage in IORs after acquiring funding. Taken
together with the non-finding between IORs and growth, an interesting plausible story emerges.
It may be the case that firms seek funding for growth, but engage in IORs for other purposes. For
example, firms may seek a resource that is not available internally, but be doing so as a strategic
choice. It may be less costly to engage in an IOR to secure that resource than to develop it
internally. As such, an IOR meeting this criterion may be more likely to lead to profitability than
growth.
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Contributions
This dissertation makes several contributions to extant literature. First, results of the
literature review demonstrate that autonomy is an overlooked aspect of IORs, despite being
central to RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and being a key mediator in the relationship between
IORs and firm performance (Drees & Huegens, 2013). The lack of attention directly relating to
autonomy is even more pronounced given that many studies claimed to study autonomy do not
actually use the term (Drees & Huegens, 2013). Further, autonomy is often measured in very
different ways, such as access to financial resources (e.g., Honig et al., 2006), acquisitions (e.g.,
Teerikangas, 2012) or CEO succession (e.g., Eklund et al., 2013). By examining key theoretical
arguments surrounding autonomy (Pfeffer, 1987; Oliver, 1991a), this dissertation proposes that
autonomy has three distinct mechanisms: the ability to respond to contingencies, the ability to
avoid opportunistic behavior, and the ability to meet multiple demands. Recognizing these
mechanisms of autonomy can future researchers distinguish what, exactly, firms are trying to
accomplish in a quest for autonomy. They may also provide a foundation for building additional
theory and empirical research seeking to identify the antecedents and outcomes of each specific
mechanism.
A second contribution of this dissertation involves the nature of resources being sought in
IORs. Firms engaging in IORs are seeking resources, but the nature of the resource being sought
is also frequently overlooked or only casually examined. This dissertation contributes by
developing theory about the nature of the resources sought by the firm. Firms enter IORs
ultimately seeking remedies for dependence, but little research asks the question “dependence on
what?”. By distinguishing between financial and complementary resources a greater ability to
explain and predict outcomes is gained. For example, a firm seeking capital to pursue expansion
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of retail locations may be seeking to remedy this dependence through a venture capital
arrangement. However, venture capital funding alone is unlikely to remedy dependence if a firm
is seeking to develop a new pharmaceutical drug and lacks technical expertise, or cannot
successfully develop cloud technology needed for their software. Further, all complementary
resources are not the same. Some resources, such as manufacturing, require higher levels of
commitment than others, such as marketing (Katila et al., 2008). This dissertation recognizes this
distinction by dividing complementary resources into high and low commitment complementary
resources (Katila et al., 2008; Das et al., 1998).
A third contribution is found in the empirical results of H5a and H5b. While neither
hypothesis is supported in the initial analysis, H5a is significant in the opposite direction and
post-hoc SEM analysis finds support for H5b. These findings support the notion that autonomy
mediates the relationship between resource dependence remedies and firm performance (Drees &
Huegens, 2013). Perhaps more importantly, they do so in a theoretically grounded manner. As
the majority of studies focusing on resource dependence only casually mention autonomy, or
ignore it entirely, questions remain regarding what constitutes autonomy and how it relates to
various outcomes. This dissertation begins to answer these questions by distinguishing three
separate mechanisms of autonomy and finding empirical support for how two of those
mechanisms, the ability to avoid opportunistic behavior and the ability to meet multiple demands
simultaneously, relate to firm performance.
Further, high and low commitment complementary autonomy are found to have differing
relationships with firm performance. High commitment complementary autonomy is
hypothesized to lead to higher growth at lower commitment levels. However, higher
commitment levels are found to lead to higher growth. While this is not the expected
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relationship, it is also not illogical. As high commitment resources are rarer and more difficult to
access, securing them at a high commitment level may allow firms long-term stability that more
easily leads to firm growth. Conversely, as low commitment complementary resources are more
common and easier to access, firms should not have to undertake a large commitment to access
these resources. Overall, these findings suggest that not all IORs lead to firm performance
equally, and that both the nature of the resource and the commitment required to secure the
resource should be considered when evaluating firm performance.
A fourth contribution involves the human capital of a firm’s TMT. Human capital is
shown to have numerous positive outcomes (e.g., Unger at al., 2011) for individuals and firms.
This dissertation extends these findings by examining how the human capital of a TMT can
benefit the firm in a presence of specific IORs. Results of Hypothesis 7a show that
complementary human capital moderates the relationship between high commitment
complementary autonomy and revenue growth. This result seems especially important given the
unexpected finding in Hypothesis 5a. Pfeffer (1987) states that remedies for dependence are
likely to cause new dependencies, making any remedy less than fully effective. Hypothesis 7a
argues that complementary human capital can instead create the opportunity for both IOR
partners to work together for mutual benefit, rather than working to create a situation of
dependence that may not result in higher performance (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). As higher
commitment levels are shown to mediate the relationship between high commitment
complementary remedies and firm performance, and higher commitment levels may create
dependent situations, complementary human capital may play a very critical role in such
relationships.
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Finally, results of post-hoc analysis may shed light on the relationship between funding
and alliances and how each effect firm performance. Research suggests that venture capital
funding and alliances may be substitutes for each other (Wang et al., 2012). However, this
dissertation finds no relationship or a negative relationship between complementary resource
dependence remedies and revenue growth, but does find a significant relationship between
funding and growth. Further, results of negative binomial regression suggest that venture capital
funding leads to future IORs. As young firms have few resources of their own, this result makes
logical sense. Firms may be unable to enter into IORs due to a lack of resources available to
offer an IOR partner in exchange for other resources. However, firms that first obtain venture
capital funding are more likely to build valuable resources that can then be utilized in IORs,
allowing them greater access to such opportunities.
Limitations
Like all studies, this dissertation has limitations. First, using private companies for the
sample is less reliable than using public firms. Private firms are not legally required to announce
financial results or other activities in the same manner as public firms, creating the possibility
that available data consists more of data that firms want released, rather than a complete picture.
However, the sources used here are typically reliable, and such data is becoming more readily
available as firms are emerging to capture and sell such data (e.g., PrivCo, Pitchbook, etc.).
One specific issue with related to the use of private firms is the number of observations
present for IORs. Just over 2,000 observations of the dependent variable, revenue growth, are
present. Over 3,000 financial resource dependence remedies are also captured. However, only
152 high commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and 382 low commitment
complementary resource dependence remedies are found. Given that these observations are
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captured via firm websites and the Factiva database, it is unlikely that substantial observations
for these variables are both present and available to be collected. Firms may of course enter into
IORs without media coverage or making an announcement, but the extent to which this may be
occurring is unknown. However, given that significant effects are found with only a small
number of observations, it seems likely that any missing observations would only shed additional
light on what appears to be a significant relationship.
Second, some variables are not able to be measured in the preferred way. Financial
autonomy, measured here as the ratio of revenue to funding, is conceptualized as how well a firm
can handle unforeseen contingencies that may arise. As such, a ratio of cash to total annual
expenses would more accurately indicate how well a firm can meet its expected obligations
(George, 2005) while also having a cushion for unforeseen expenses that extend beyond the short
term. While this ratio is preferred, the measure used in this dissertation is not without merit. The
ratio of revenue to funding captures the ability of a firm to stand on its own to operate. Firms
seeking venture capital are typically focused on growth (Zacharakis et al., 2012) and are less
concerned about profitability. It is thus likely that a large percentage of funds that are available
are used for the operation and growth of the firm. Additionally, owners are incentivized to accept
venture capital in the amount required, as accepting additional capital results in costly equity
payments and accepting less may result the need to simply raise more capital soon or make
suboptimal strategic decisions. As firms sell larger equity stakes for funding, future funding
opportunities will eventually dissipate. Therefore, firms with higher ratios of revenue to funding
are expected to have greater access to future funding and thus greater financial autonomy. Future
research examining financial autonomy in the context of entrepreneurial firms should consider
survey research or other creative measures, as data pertaining to cash positions and annual
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expenses are unlikely to be widely available. Indeed, this data was sought from numerous
sources that collect information on private companies, including PrivCo, Mergent,
ReferenceUSA, and Pitchbook, without success.
Board opportunism, measured as the number of outsiders on the board of directors, may
also be best measured in a different manner. Venture capital firms may have dozens or even
hundreds of firms in their investment portfolio. The mean number of interlocks present on boards
in this sample is 16.44, the majority of which are due to board members placed by venture
capital firms. While their presence, as compared to absence, certainly increases the likelihood of
opportunistic behavior taking place, the number of board members spend with the firm may be a
better indicator of opportunism (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2002). Again, exploring such a concept in
entrepreneurial firms may be best done via survey research. However, given that opportunism is
used as a control variable rather than an independent variable of primary interest, the
measurement of outsiders likely suffices.
Board monitoring, measured as the ratio of insiders to outsiders plus one, also suffers
from limitations. Adding one to the denominator of the ratio prevents divisions by zero and the
creation of missing data, but also creates a non-linear transformation. For example, a firm with
one insider and zero outsiders has a ratio of 1.0, a firm with one insider and one outsider has a
ratio of 0.5, and a firm with one insider and two outsiders has a ratio of 0.33. The inverse of this
ratio, outsiders divided by insiders, may prevent the majority of data from being lost while not
causing this issue, as most firms have at least one insider on the board. However, in instances
where there are no insiders, data would be missing when it is actually a situation ripe for heavy
monitoring. This causes the removal of what would otherwise by the maximum values for
monitoring in the sample.
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Another limitation deals with the names of high and low complementary remedies
and autonomy. This dissertation builds on existing research by Katila et al. (2008) by using the
concepts of high and low commitment complementary resources and then naming them
accordingly. Further, high and low complementary autonomy are proposed to mediate the
relationship between each remedy and performance, matching the names of the resources. While
these labels are based on descriptions from established literature (Katila et al., 2008), they may
also be potentially misleading. This is due to the predictions made in hypotheses 5a and 5b,
which state that lower commitment levels will positively mediate the relationship between
remedies and performance. The hypotheses are discussing the commitment level of the remedy
based on its structure (e.g., distribution agreement, independent joint venture, etc.), while high
and low commitment remedies are labels assigned based on the specific resource sought in the
IOR (e.g., advertising, manufacturing, etc.). The use of high and low commitment as descriptors
for both the type and structure of the remedy may create unnecessary difficulty in explaining the
concepts, regardless of their previous establishment in the literature.
Going forward, it is likely wise to relabel high and low commitment complementary
remedies as well as high and low commitment autonomy. Relabeling all of these constructs can
create a clearer distinction between the remedies, the mechanism driving each type of autonomy,
and also allow the stated hypotheses to continue using the accurate description of lower
commitment levels being required for mediation. Further, the theoretical foundations for each
construct will remain unchanged.
First, high commitment complementary resources could be renamed direct resources.
High commitment complementary resources grant access to rarer, scarce, resources that are
likely to require fixed costs (Katila et al., 2008). An examination of IORs in this sample suggests
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that these resources are likely to be directly linked to the development or sale of a firm’s
products or services. For example, multiple firms in the sample entered into IORs with other
firms with the intent to integrate their respective software products to offer a superior product to
specific customers or create additional benefits for existing customers. Thus, the label direct
resources clearly describes how the resource will be used and distinguishes it from low
commitment complementary resources, which could be renamed indirect resources. Examination
of the IORs in the sample suggests that low commitment complementary resources grant access
to resources such as advertising, marketing, and distribution. These are clearly indirect
resources. This label may be superior to low commitment complementary resources, as it more
precisely describes the nature of the resources and offers a clear distinction from direct
resources.
Finally, high and low commitment complementary autonomy, which are named to match
the resource that they mediate, should also thus be renamed. One contribution of this dissertation
is recognition of the need for theoretical development of autonomy and the proposal of three
mechanisms of autonomy each working in conjunction with a specific resource. High and low
complementary autonomy, which accurate descriptions, do not refer to the theoretical
mechanism that drives each type of autonomy. High commitment complementary autonomy is
defined as the ability to avoid opportunistic behavior, and could thus be renamed opportunistic
autonomy. Low commitment complementary autonomy is defined as the ability to meet multiple
demands simultaneously, suggesting a choice from multiple options, and could thus be renamed
matrix autonomy.
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Future Research
Results suggest several possible avenues for future research that may be fruitful. First, the
relationship between low commitment complementary resource dependence remedies and
growth is shown to be negative, counter to what is hypothesized. Logically, such IORs should
help a firm continue to grow, or at least not hinder growth. A negative relationship may suggest
that firms unable to internally develop resources needed for the continued development of the
firm (Das et al., 1998). Future research could further explore the link between such IORs and
firm performance while also examining the resource capabilities of the firm.
Next, the theoretical arguments described in Chapter III merit further investigation,
especially given the limitations outlined above. While financial autonomy in private firms is
unlikely to be captured using a measure of cash/total expenses, other options may exist. Firms
that acquire funding do so in exchange for a percentage of equity. The percentage of equity is
sometimes, but not always, available. This percentage may also be derived if the overall
valuation of the firm during a particular funding event is known, as it could simply be used in a
ratio of funds given to valuation. Obtaining such a measure and using it in conjunction with the
ratio of revenue to funding used here can provide a more detailed look at financial autonomy.
Specifically, researchers would know how well the firm is currently standing on its own via the
ratio of revenue to funding, and have some indication of how much external funding may still be
available. Firms highly dependent on outside funding that have only sold a small percentage of
equity should have, all else equal, greater financial autonomy than firms that have sold a higher
percentage of equity.
Results of Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 7a, and 7b also suggest avenues for future research. As
different types of analyses find different results, and some results are counter to those
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hypothesized, future research should reconsider the theoretical argument presented here,
carefully select appropriate analysis for the sample that is collected, and work to further support
these relationships or identify potential weaknesses in them.
Next, while the moderating effect of board capital on financial autonomy is not
significant, the non-finding could be due to the previously mentioned issues with the
measurement of financial autonomy. Further, results point to a potentially promising avenue of
investigation. Results show that the direct effect between the human capital aspect of board
capital and revenue growth is negative and significant. As lower numbers represent higher
amounts of board capital, this suggests that board capital positively influences revenue growth
and is worthy of future investigation as both a direct effect and a moderator.
Next, while autonomy is established as a mediator between remedies and performance
(Drees & Huegens, 2013), there may be other important relationships. For example, autonomy is
measured at a point in time in this dissertation. However, it changes over time and that change
may also be relevant to firm performance or other outcomes of interest. Another possibility is
that autonomy may have a non-linear effect. It seems reasonable that some lower levels of
autonomy, such as those involving distribution or licensing agreements, may not produce a
significantly different effect from each other. At higher levels, though, there is a clearer
difference between an independent joint venture and an acquisition. Mathematically, these
differences are much closer than they may be in practice. Future research could further develop
this logic and propose non-linear effects.
Finally, future research could propose a finer-grained measure of complementary
resources. While some resources are clearly high commitment (e.g., manufacturing) and some
are clearly low commitment (e.g., advertising), some are not so clear (e.g., technology). Drawing
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on the arguments outlined above for possible renaming of high and low complementary
resources, the level of commitment could perhaps instead be measured by how necessary the
resource is for the primary operations of the firm. For example, a company that sells products is
clearly highly dependent on manufacturing to produce the product, but likely less dependent on a
supplier of food for the company cafeteria. Conversely, a restaurant that specializes in a certain
cuisine may be dependent on the supplier of the ingredients, but not dependent on the
manufacturer used to create products for customers to purchase and take home. This relatedness
to core business operations may perhaps be measured using the industries of the partners. Firms
in the same industry would be more likely to indicate a resource necessary for the core business
that carry higher commitments, while firms in different industries may be more likely to indicate
resources that are not directly related to the core business.
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION
The overall goal of this dissertation is to expand and examine concepts surrounding interorganizational relationships. Findings suggest that the theoretical distinctions made between
different types of resources and different mechanisms of autonomy likely have merit.
Specifically, the nature of resources being accessed through an IOR are shown to be a critical
component of the relationship between IORs and firm performance, and that the level of
commitment that firms should undertake when entering into IORs should vary depending on the
resource sought. Further, additional factors beyond the resource sought and the commitment
level present in securing that resource are also considered. Results suggest that the potential for
IOR partners to work together for mutual gain is important in high commitment situations, but
not a factor in low commitment situations.
The broad topics related to resource dependence explored in this dissertation have been
examined for decades with many advances. However, the specific questions asked here have yet
to be answered, despite acknowledgements that resource dependence theory is often used as a
metaphor rather than a theoretical foundation (Wry et al., 2011), and that remedies for
dependence lead to firm performance in different ways that are currently unknown (Drees &
Huegens, 2013). This dissertation attempts to advance resource dependence theory and its related
concepts by studying these questions. Overall, the theory presented and empirical results found
begin to shed light on these areas and lays a path for future research to make additional advances.
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Dalton, 1993
Daily &
Dalton, 1992
Daily &
Dalton, 1992
De Clercq &
Voronov,
2009
de Villiers,
Naiker, &

Venture Capital
Financing
Board size,
reputation,
composition, and
structure

ET&P

Financial

Microcredit
borrowing

ET&P

Financial

New management
team installation

JBV

Financial

Alliance networks

JMS

Complementary

Board of directors

JMS

Complementary

Board of directors

ET&P

Financial

Board of directors

JSBM

Financial

CEO replacement

JBV

Financial

Board of directors

JSBM

Complementary

Resource
Acquisition

JOM

Complementary
.

Board of directors

Resource
dependenc
e theory;
RBV
Phenomen
on driven
Upper
echelons
theory
RBV;
Organizati
onal
learning
Phenomen
on driven
Signaling
theory
Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
RBV

Resource
dependenc
e theory
Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
Theory of
practice

Agency
theory

Resource
Stability
Power Balance
Resource
Stability

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Power Balance
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Both
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
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van Staden,
2011
DeTienne &
Cardon,
2012
D’Souza &
McDougall,
1989
Ehrhardt &
Nowak,
2003
Eklund,
Palmberg, &
Wiberg,
2013
Feeser &
Willard,
1990
Feldman,
Amit, &
Villalonga,
2016

SBE

Financial

Exit

ET&P

Complementary

Joint Ventures

JSBM

Financial

IPO

SBE

SMJ

SMJ

Complementary

CEO succession

Complementary

Acquisitions;
Business
incubator
origination

Financial

Divestitures

Fink &
Harms, 2012

ERD

Complementary

Alliances

Fried,
Bruton, &
Hisrich,
1998

JBV

Complementary

Board of directors

Gabrielsson,
2007

Gales &
Blackburn,
1990

ET&P

ET&P

Complementary

N/A

Board of directors

Buyer-supplier
relationships

Threshold
theory
I/O theory,
location
theory
Phenomen
on driven
Agency
theory

Phenomen
on driven
Agency
theory

Theory of
cooperatio
n based on
selfcommitme
nt
Agency
theory;
Institution
al theory
Agency
theory;
Resource
dependenc
e theory

Phenomen
on driven

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Both

Power Balance

Resource
Stability

Resource
Stability

Power Balance:
Firms remain
legally
independent

Resource
Stability

Power Balance

Resource
Stability:
Control over
critical
resources
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Garg, 2013

AMR

Financial

Board of directors

Agency
theory;
Resource
dependenc
e theory

Resource
Stability

Resource
Stability

Goldberg,
Cohen, &
Fiegenbaum,
2003

JSBM

Complementary

Alliances

Strategic
reference
point
theory

Golden &
Dollinger,
1993

ET&P

Complementary

IORs

Game
Theory

JBV

Complementary

Spin-offs

ET&P

Complementary

Resource
Acquisition

Grandi &
Grimaldi,
2005
Greene,
Brush, &
Hart, 1999
Harrison,
Hitt,
Hoskisson,
& Ireland,
2001
Hegde &
Tumlinson,
2014
Honig,
Lerner, &
Raban, 2006
Hustedde &
Pulver, 1992
Inkpen &
Crossan,
1995
Izquierdo,
Carrion, &
Gutierrez,
2008
Jones,
Lanctot, &
Teegan,
2001

Phenomen
on driven

Power Balance

JOM

Complementary

Alliances

MS

Financial

IPO

Phenomen
on driven
Signaling
theory

Financial

Venture Capital

JBV

Financial

Venture Capital

JMS

Complementary

Joint Ventures

ERD

Complementary

Relational
marketing
partnerships

Complementary

External
technology
acquisition

JBV

Resource
Stability

RBV

Phenomen
on driven

SBE

Power Balance

Phenomen
on driven
Organizati
onal
learning
Relational
contracting
theory
Phenomen
on driven

Resource
Stability

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability

Both

Resource
Stability
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Kanter,
Richardson,
North, &
Morgan,
1991
Keh,
Nguyen, &
Ng, 2007
Koka &
Prescott,
2008

Complementary

Corporate
Venturing

JBV

Complementary

Information
acquisition

SMJ

Complementary Alliance networks

JBV

Kroll,
Walters, &
Le, 2007

AMJ

Complementary

Board of directors

Larson,
1991

JBV

Complementary

Alliances

ERD

Financial and
Complementary

Access to a
cluster’s resource
base

SMJ

Financial

Alliances

AMJ

Complementary

Alliance

SMJ

Complementary

Alliances

Lechner &
Leyronas,
2012
Levitas &
McFayden,
2009
Li &
AtuaheneGima, 2001
Li &
AtuaheneGima, 2002

Li, Wei, &
Liu, 2010

Phenomen
on driven

Phenomen
on driven
Contingen
cy theory
Agency
theory;
Resource
dependenc
e theory
Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven

Phenomen
on driven
Resource
dependenc
e theory
RBV

Phenomen
on driven
JMS

Complementary

Outsourcing

Lichtenstein
& Brush,
2001

ET&P

Complementary

Resource
acquisition

Lu &
Beamish,
2006

JBV

Complementary

Joint ventures

RBV;
Resource
dependenc
e theory
RBV;
Institution
al theory

Power Balance:
Decision
making
freedom of
venture
managers
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability

Power Balance

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability:
Structural
Holes
Both
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Power Balance:
Outsourcing
should lead to
future
autonomy; not
tested or further
discussed
Resource
Stability

Both
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Lu &
Beamish,
2001

Lynall,
Golden, &
Hillman,
2003

MacMillan,
Block, &
Narasimha,
1986
Malo &
Norus, 2009
Marino,
Strandholm,
Steensma, &
Weaver,
2002
McCann,
1991
McGee,
Dowling, &
Megginson,
1995
Meuleman,
Amess,
Wright, &
Scholes,
2009
Meyskens &
Carsrud,
2013
Niederkofler
, 1991
Ozcan &
Eisenhardt,
2009

SMJ

Complementary

Alliances

Phenomen
on driven

Board of directors

Agency
theory;
Resource
dependenc
e theory;
Institution
al theory;
Social
network
theory

Resource
Stability

Power Balance:
Power of CEO
and external
financiers is
discussed

AMJ

Complementary
and Financial

JBV

Financial

Joint ventures

Phenomen
on driven

Power Balance

ERD

Complementary

Alliances

Phenomen
on driven

Resource
Stability

ET&P

Complementary

Alliances

JBV

Complementary

Joint ventures

SMJ

Complementary

Cooperative
agreements

Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
Strategic
behavior
theory

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability

Agency
theory
ET&P

Financial

Buy-outs

SBE

Complementary

Partnership
diversity

JBV

Complementary

Alliances

AMJ

Complementary

Alliance
portfolios

Both

Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
Network
theory;
Resource
dependenc
e theory

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Power Balance:
Discussion of
interdependenc
e between firms
in a network
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Patzelt,
Shepherd,
Deeds, &
Bradley,
2008

JBV

Financial

Alliances

Phenomen
on driven

Randoy &
Goel, 2003

JBV

Financial

Board of directors

JBV

Financial

Board of directors

JBV

Complementary

Board of directors

Agency
theory
Phenomen
on driven
Agency
theory;
TCE

Rosenstein,
1988
Rosenstein,
Bruno,
Bygrave, &
Taylor, 1993
Sarkar,
Echambadi,
& Harrison,
2001
Sedaitis,
1998

SMJ

OS

Shu, Liu,
Gao, &
Shanley,
2014

ET&P

Soh, 2003

JBV

Stam, 2010

JMS

Stam &
Elfring,
2008
Tan, Zhang,
& Wang,
2015
Teerikangas,
2012
Vissa &
Chacar,
2009

AMJ

Complementary

Alliances

Complementary Alliance networks

Complementary

Alliances

Complementary Alliance networks
Complementary

Participation in
industry events

Complementary

Bridging ties

ET&P

Complementary

Structural holes

JOM

Complementary

Acquisitions

SMJ

Complementary

Structural holes

Phenomen
on driven

Phenomen
on driven

Knowledg
e spillover
theory

Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
Phenomen
on driven
Structural
hole
theory
Phenomen
on driven
Structural
hole
theory

Both:
Managerial
Discretion
(Financial
Slack)
Power Balance
Power Balance
Resource
Stability

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability:
Autonomy, as
defined by
Lumpkin and
Dess, is less
important than
competitive
aggressiveness
in alliances
Power Balance
Power Balance
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Power Balance
Resource
Stability

130

Wadhwa &
Kotha, 2006
Walters,
Kroll, &
Wright,
2010

AMJ

Financial

AMJ

Financial

Wijbenga,
Postma, &
Stratling,
2007

ET&P

Complementary

Woodcock,
Beamish, &
Makino,
1994

JIBS

Financial

Yoo,
Schenkel, &
Kim, 2014

JSBM

Financial

Zahra, 1995

JBV

Financial

Zahra &
Hayton,
2008

JBV

Financial

Zahra,
Neubaum, &
Huse, 2000

JOM

Financial

Corporate venture
capital

Phenomen
on driven
Agency
theory;
Board of directors
Stewardshi
p theory
Agency
theory;
Venture Capital
Resource
firm services
dependenc
e theory
Contingen
cy theory
Market entry
Agency
theory;
Stewardshi
Board of directors
p theory;
Identity
theory
Agency
Buyouts
theory
Organizati
onal
Alliances
learning
theory
Agency
Corporate
theory
entrepreneurship

Resource
Stability
Power Balance

Power Balance

Resource
Stability

Power Balance

Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
Resource
Stability
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Figure 3.1. Model.

H1

Financial
Remedies

Board
Capital

H4

Financial Autonomy
H6
H2

High Commit.
Comp. Remedies

H5a

High Commit.
Comp. Autonomy

Low Commit.
Comp. Remedies

Low Commit. Comp.
Autonomy

Firm
Performance

H7a
H5b
H7b

H3

Complementary
Human Capital
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Table 5.1. Summary
Statistics.
Variable
Firm Performance
Fin. Dependence Remedy
High Commit. Comp.
Remedy
Low Commit. Comp.
Remedy

Obs
2,140
3,711

Mean
2.09
1.09

Std.
Dev.
7.41
0.71

Min
-1
0

Max
200.01
5.00

3,802

0.12

0.45

0

5.00

3,802

0.34

1.07

0

14.00

Financial Autonomy
High Commit. Comp. Auto.
Low Commit Comp. Auto.
Firm Size

3,058
3,800
3,800
2,974

8.92
0.03
0.05
117.89

7.65
0.08
0.08
556.41

0
0
0
0

22.55
1.00
0.56
15,000

Comp. Human Cap.
Board (Human) Capital
Board (Social) Capital

3,802
2,155
3,757

0.10
.055
16.45

0.18
.294
27.68

0
.016
0

1.00
1
212

Board Size
VC Reputation
Ent. Human Capital
Board Monitoring
Board Opportunism
Firm Age
TMT Size

2,196
3,775
3,775
2,187
2,187
3,776
2,934

3.97
0.00
2.07
0.18
3.53
3.11
3.50

2.22
0.01
2.44
0.53
2.19
2.08
2.35

1
0
0
0
0
0
1

12
0.27
18
6.00
11.00
9.00
13.00
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Table 5.2. Correlation Matrix.
Firm
Perf.
Firm
Performance
Fin. Dep.
Remedy
High
Commit.
Remedy
Low
Commit.
Remedy

Fin.
Dep.
Remedy

High
Commit.
Remedy

Low
Commit.
Remedy

Comp.
Human
Cap.

High
Commit.
Auto.

Low
Commit
Auto.

Firm
Size

TMT
Size

Board
Size

VC
Rep.

Ent
Human
Cap.

Board
Mon.

Board
Opp.

1
0.04

1

-0.04

0.05**

1

-0.05*

0.04*

0.47**

1

-0.02

0.08**

0.39**

0.58**

1

0.04

0.09**

0.59**

0.21**

0.31**

1

-0.01

0.08**

0.26**

0.48**

0.66**

0.31**

1

Firm Size

-0.03

-0.01

0.07**

0.07**

0.01

0.08**

0.11**

1

TMT Size

0.06

-0.07**

-0.005

0.04*

0.03

0.06**

0.07**

0.03

1

Board Size

0.00

0.02

0.10**

0.11**

0.19**

0.12**

0.15**

0.07**

0.08**

1

VC
Reputation

0

0.03*

-0.01

-0.01

-0.03

-0.01

-0.01

0

0.02

-0.03

1

Ent. Human
Cap.

0.03

-0.11**

0.02

0.06**

0.06**

0.05**

0.08**

-0.01

0.36**

0.03

0.01

1

Board
Monitoring

-0.03

0

0.01

0.08**

0.08**

0.02

0.02

-0.03

-0.08**

0.05*

0

-0.09**

1

Board Opp.

0.02

0

0.07**

0.07**

0.14**

0.08**

0.12**

0.07**

0.12**

0.91**

-0.02

0.08**

-0.3**

1

Firm Age

-0.20**

0.10**

0.25**

0.34**

0.13**

0.03*

0.08**

0.11**

-0.10**

0.05**

-0.06**

-0.09**

0.02

0.04

Comp.
Human Cap.
High
Commit.
Auto.
Low
Commit
Auto.

Firm
Age

1
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Table 5.3. Mixed-Effects Regression Analysis.
Dependent Variables: Firm Performance (Sales Growth)
Variable

Model 1: Controls

Financial Remedy
High Commitment
Complementary
Remedy
Low Commitment
Complementary
Remedy

Model 2:
Main Effects

Model 3: Moderation

0.458**

0.252

0.185

-0.266

-0.099**

0.029

Financial Autonomy
High Commit. Comp. Auto
Low Commit. Comp. Auto

-0.033
6.186**
-2.383*

Comp. Human Capital
High Commit. Comp. Auto
* Comp. Human Cap
Low Commit. Comp. Auto
* Comp. Human Cap

-0.162
-7.093*

Board (Human) Capital
Board (Human) Capital
* Fin. Autonomy
Board (Social) Capital
Board (Social) Capital
* Fin. Autonomy

-0.98**
0.024

Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
Firm Age
VC Reputation
Firm Size
TMT Size
Board Monitoring

3.472

0.002
0
0.079
-0.062
-0.048*
-0.628**
-3.25**
-0**
-0.03
-0.24*

0.029
-0.015
-0.04*
-0.71**
-5.098*
-0.00**
-0.144
-0.03

0.026
-0.061
-0.036
-0.566**
-6.987**
-0.001**
-0.061**
-0.203

3.98**
3.54**
3.93**
3.62**
4.03**
4.3**
4.44**
3.28**
2.84**

3.84**
3.48**
3.97**
3.75**
4.26**
4.58**
4.83**
3.66**
2.83**

3.517**
3.055**
3.348**
3.013**
3.468**
3.635**
3.788**
2.474**
1.667**

.12**
921
164.61**
-1972.45
3984.91 (20)

-0.326**
921
191.47**
-1961.2
3968.39 (23)

1.265**
885
223.96**
-1855.81

Year:
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Intercept
N
Wald χ2
Log-Likelihood
AIC (df)
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Table 5.4. Sobel-Goodman
Mediation – Financial Autonomy
Model with dv regressed

Model with dv regressed
on

Model with mediator regressed

on iv (path c)

on iv (path a)

mediator and iv (paths b and c')

SS

df

MS

SS

df

MS

SS

df

MS

Model

799.96

18

44.44

41377.53

18

2298.75

802.87

19

42.26

Residual
Total

3832.65
4632.606

915
933

4.19
4.965

14427.73
55805.262

915
933

15.77
59.813

3829.74
4632.606

914
933

4.19
4.965

N = 934

F(18, 915) = 10.61

N = 934

F(18,915) = 145.79

N = 934

F(19, 914) = 10.08

Root MSE = 2.05

Prob > F = 0

Root MSE = 3.97

Prob > F = 0

Root MSE = 2.05

Prob > F = 0

R2

Adj R2 = 0.16

R2

= 0.17

Adj

R2

Firm Performance

Coef.

Financial Dependence
Remedy

0.572

R2

= 0.16

= 0.74

Adj

R2

Financial Autonomy

**

Financial Dependence
Remedy

= 0.74
Coef.

-10.507

Firm Performance

Coef.

**

Financial Autonomy

*

Financial Dependence
Remedy

-0.014
0.423

Board Size

0.025

Board Size

0.033

Board Size

Board Opportunism

-0.023

Board Opportunism

0.429

Ent. Human Capital

-0.056

Ent. Human Capital

-0.030

Board Opportunism

-0.017

Firm Age

-0.473

0.049

Ent. Human Capital

-0.056

VC Repuation

-8.252

VC Repuation

Firm Age

-0.472

Firm Size

0.000

Firm Size

0.001

VC Repuation

-7.785

Board Monitoring

-0.152

Board Monitoring

0.634

TMT Size

-0.041

Intercept

2.696

**

**

-0.538

= 0.17

Firm Age

32.892

TMT Size

-0.055

Intercept

24.654

**

Firm Size
**

0.000

Board Monitoring

-0.143

TMT Size

-0.041

Intercept

3.046

Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests
Sobel

0.14919819

Proportion of total effect mediated

0.26092214

Indirect effect =

0.149198

Goodman-1 (Aroian)

0.14919819

Ratio of indirect to direct effect:

0.35303741

Direct effect =

0.422613

Goodman-2

0.14919819

Ratio of total to direct effect:

1.3530374

Total effect =

0.571811

a coefficient =

-10.508**

b coefficient =

-0.014199

**
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Table 5.5. Sobel-Goodman Mediation –
High Commitment Complementary
Autonomy
Model with dv regressed
on iv (path c)
SS

df

MS
18
915
933

Model with mediator regressed
on iv (path a)
SS
df

38.586
4.304
4.965

3.676
3.276
6.953

MS
18
915
933

0.2042
0.0036
0.0075

Model with dv regressed
on
mediator and iv (paths b and c')
SS
df

MS

769.02
3863.58
4632.606

19
914
933

40.47
4.23
4.965

Model
Residual
Total

694.540
3938.066
4632.606

N = 934
Root MSE = 2.07

F(18, 934) = 8.97
Prob > F = 0

N = 934
Root MSE = .059

F(18,934) = 57.04
Prob > F = 0

N = 934
Root MSE = 2.056

F(19, 934) = 9.58
Prob > F =

R2 = 0.16

Adj R2 = 0.13

R2 = .53

Adj R2 = .52

R2 = .166

Adj R2 = .149

Firm Performance

Coef.

High Commit. Comp.
Auto.

Coef.

High Commit. Remedy

0.181

High Commit. Remedy

0.122

**

0.015
-0.015
0.001

**
**

Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital

0.068
-0.059
-0.055

Firm Age
VC Repuation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
Intercept

-0.479
-4.631
0
-0.253
-0.03
3.49

Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
**

**

Firm Age
VC Repuation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
Intercept

-0.008
0.2
0.00E+00
-0.15
0.001
0.035

**

**

Firm Performance

Coef.

High Commit. Comp.
Auto.

4.770

**

-0.398
-0.005
0.013
59.000
-0.441
-5.588
0.000
-0.182
-0.034
3.330

*

High Commit. Remedy
Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
Firm Age
VC Repuation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
Intercept

**
**

**

Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests
Sobel
Goodman-1 (Aroian)
Goodman-2
a coefficient =
b coefficient =

0.58
0.58
0.58

**
**
**

0.122
4.77

**
**

Indirect effect =
Direct effect =

0.58
-0.39

Total effect =

0.182

**
**

Proportion of total effect mediated
Ratio of indirect to direct effect:
Ratio of total to direct
effect:

3.189
-1.46
-0.457
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Table 5.6. Sobel-Goodman Mediation – Low Commitment
Complementary Autonomy
Model with dv regressed
on iv (path c)

Model with mediator regressed
on iv (path a)
SS
df

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual
Total

689.90
3942.70
4632.606

18
915
933

38.33
4.31
4.965

N = 934
Root MSE = 2.08

F(18, 934) = 8.89
Prob > F = 0

N = 934
Root MSE = .076

R2 = 0.15

Adj R2 = 0.13

R2 = 0.323

2.56
5
7.868

MS

18
915
933

0.14
0.01
0.008

4632.606

F(18,915) = 24.52
Prob > F = 0

N = 934
Root MSE = 2.07

F(19, 914) = 8.45
Prob > F = 0

Adj R2 = 0.31

R2 = 0.15

Adj R2 = 0.13

Low Commit. Comp.
Auto.

Coef.

Low Commit. Comp.
Remedy.

-0.039

Low Commit. Comp.
Remedy.

0.040

**

Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
Firm Age
VC Repuation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
Intercept

0.093
-0.079
-0.050
-0.465
-4.540
0.000
-0.279
-0.290
3.450

Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
Firm Age
VC Repuation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
Intercept

0.021
-0.020
0.001
-0.005
0.798
0.000
-0.032
0.000
0.050

**
**

**
**

**

692.50

MS

19
914
933

Coef.

Firm Performance

Model with dv regressed
on
mediator and iv (paths b and c')
SS
df

3940.10473

Firm Performance

*
*
**
**
**

36.45
4.31
4.965

Coef.

Low Commit. Comp.
Auto.

-0.700

Low Commit. Comp.
Remedy.
Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
Firm Age
VC Repuation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
Intercept

-0.011
0.109
-0.094
-0.050
-0.469
-3.975
0.000
-0.301
-0.029
3.76

**
*

**

Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests
Sobel
Goodman-1 (Aroian)
Goodman-2
a coefficient =
b coefficient =

0.028
0.028
0.028
0.039
-0.699

**

Indirect effect =
Direct effect =

-0.028
-0.011

Total effect =

-0.039

Proportion of total effect mediated
Ratio of indirect to direct effect:
Ratio of total to direct
effect:

0.711
2.46
3.46
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Table 5.7. Mixed-Effects Regression Analysis.

DV: Firm Performance (Sales Growth)

Variable

Model 1: Board Human
Cap.

Financial Autonomy

-0.05**

Model 2: Board
Social Cap.

Model 3:
Comp. Human
Cap. (High
Auto)

Model 4:
Comp.
Human
Cap. (Low
Auto)

-0.04**

High Commit. Comp. Auto

5.3**
-1.17*

Low Commit. Comp. Auto

Comp. Human Capital

-0.48**

High Commit. Comp. Auto

-6.51†

-0.44

* Comp. Human Cap
2.29

Low Commit. Comp. Auto
* Comp. Human Cap

Board (Human) Capital
Board (H) Capital * Fin. Auto.

-0.95**
0.03

Board (S) Capital

0.00

Board (S) Capital * Fin. Auto.

-0.00

Board Size

0.04

-0.01

0.05

0.12

Board Opportunism

-0.18

-0.09

-0.2

-0.31*

Ent. Human Capital

-0.04

-0.05**

-0.04*

-0.05†

Firm Age

-0.53**

-0.59**

-0.61**

-0.61**

VC Reputation

-7.73**

-5.39**

-4.6**

-2.43*

Firm Size

-0.00**

-.00**

-0.00**

-0.00**

TMT Size

-0.54**

-0.04**

-0.03

-0.03

-0.05

0.01

-0.03

-0.1

2009

3.53**

3.8**

3.89**

4.01**

2010

3.08**

3.36**

3.42**

3.58**

2011

3.38**

3.71**

3.76**

3.96**

2012

2.91**

3.34**

3.54**

3.65**

2013

3.3**

3.75

3.96**

4.07**

2014

3.46**

3.95**

4.21**

4.32**

2015

3.54**

4.08**

4.35**

4.46**

2016

2.23**

2.71**

3.13**

3.29**

2017

1.45**

2.07**

2.8**

2.77**

Intercept

1.62**

0.7**

0.19**

0.12†

890

916

921

921

-1877.91

-1952.43

-11961.79

-1971.56

3801.82 (23)

3950.98 (23)

3969.58 (23)

3989.2 (23)

Board Monitoring
Year:

N
Log-Likelihood
AIC (df)
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Table 5.8. Mixed-effects negative binomial
regression
Overdispersion: mean
Group variable: Industry
Groups = 18
Obs per group
min = 2
avg = 65.1
max = 634

method: mvaghermite
Integration points = 7

DV: IORs (lag)

Coef.

Financial Dependence Remedies
Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
Firm Age
VC Reputation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

0.148
0.388
-0.271
0.098
0.328
1.828
0.000
-0.382
0.029
0.000
-19.245
-0.772
-1.221
-1.346
-0.910
-1.001
-0.767
-0.642
0.000

DV: VC Funding (lag)
**
**
**
**
**
*

**
**
**
**
**
**

IORs
Board Size
Board Opportunism
Ent. Human Capital
Firm Age
VC Reputation
Firm Size
Board Monitoring
TMT Size
year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

0.032
0.082
-0.084
-0.132
0.124
2.97
-0.0001
-0.209
0.003

**

**

Intercept

-0.769

/lnalpha

0.65

**

/lnalpha

-16.7

N = 1,186
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Prob > χ2

*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

-3.88

2960000
-466.67
0.00

*

0
1.12
0.96
0.873
0.655
0.493
0.386
0.385
0.135
0

Intercept

N = 1,171
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Prob > χ2

**
*
*

167
-1440.16
0
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Figure 5.2. Moderation Plot.
3

Firm Performance
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